Comment to “Breaking Barriers in intercultural philosophy: the power of empathy and interrelationship”Prazeres (2024) presents a very clear and rich conception of what it means to do intercultural philosophy, and of how to learn from other philosophical traditions without falling into a dualistic or relativistic perspective. I believe that Prazeres’ paper is truly a decisive contribution for the studies in intercultural philosophy, both in Brazil and on a global level, as it discusses with clarity and precise reasoning some of the most important questions those who want to think and practice philosophy interculturally have to deal with today. With this in mind, I would like to contribute to the discussion opened by the article through some comments about some of the topics approached in it that I consider to be of the utmost importance.
Prazeres (2024) argues that intercultural and comparative philosophy are two different approaches that, while capable of contributing to one another, have to be properly distinguished and recognized in their differences. According to her, while comparative philosophy would have as its aim
[…] the systematic comparison of different philosophical traditions or schools of thought with the aim of identifying similarities, differences and possible areas of convergence or divergence [intercultural philosophy] emphasizes the need to engage with diverse cultural perspectives in order to broaden and enrich our philosophical discussion of an issue (Prazeres, 2024, p. 3).
However, while we agree that is important to draw some sort of distinction between the two fields, I believe that both of them depend on one another in order to be possible to practice them appropriately. In fact, I believe it that comparison is indispensable for intercultural philosophy, since, as I have argued elsewhere (Machado, 2022), the positing both of identity and of difference is only possible through comparison, and every intercultural dialogue presupposes an understanding of each tradition that is put into dialogue in terms of their similarities and differences. Of course, as Prazeres points out, when comparing different traditions, one runs the risk of reinforcing cultural stereotypes and treat one of the traditions compared as the neutral standpoint through which both traditions should be understood evaluated in their merits (Amanda, 2024). This, however, is precisely why comparative philosophy also requires intercultural philosophy: because it is also the object of intercultural philosophy to put different traditions in contact in such a way that puts into question the very understanding we have of the alleged defining traits of those traditions, as well as any attempt to prioritize one tradition over another, treating it as the “golden standard” through which all other traditions should be measured and understood. In other words, we have to compare in other to dialogue, but we also need the dialogue in order to change and refine the parameters through which we compare. Thus, in my view, one should see comparative and intercultural philosophy as standing in a relationship of co-dependence - an idea that, I believe, aligns very well with Prazeres’ outlook on intercultural philosophy in terms of Nishitani’s concept of reciprocal interpenetration, only further applying to, so to speak, on a “metaphilosophical” level.
Prazeres (2024) makes an incredibly important point about the intercultural method when discussing Nishitani’s concept of learning. In fact, I believe one of the most important contributions of Prazeres’ paper lies in her philosophically accurate conception of empathy, as that attitude which “involves the act of making an effort to comprehend another being’s suchness” and which “is rooted in the existential practice of relating to the other by practicing or imitating something/somebody’s elemental way of being”, in such a way that “[… ]empathy is an experimental process, not merely an intellectual one” (Prazeres, 2024, p. 11). In defining empathy in this way, I believe Prazeres aligns with the hadotian (Hadot, 2004) understanding of ancient philosophy as a way of life, which implies an understanding of wisdom and of knowledge in which to truly know something philosophically is to become the very thing which is known, to participate in its being. In Portuguese, I have attempted to express this understanding of knowledge by coining the term “conhe-ser”, a play with the Portuguese words for “knowing” (“conhecer”) und “being” (“ser”).
Thus, I believe it is no coincidence that, by reflecting about the methodology of intercultural philosophy, Prazeres has reached the conclusion that the kind of knowledge it has to strive for has to be understood in terms of a process that cannot be only intellectual, but requires experimenting what it means to be like that which is known. In fact, I believe, for reasons I intend to further develop in future publications, that, for a long time, this was the paradigmatic way to conceive of and to search for philosophical knowledge, both in European and in non-european traditions. But, with the decline of the paradigm of philosophy as a way of life in medieval times and in modernity, as described by Hadot, philosophy came to be understood and reified in modernity as a purely discursive occupation which does not require the sort of existential practice pointed out by Prazeres (2024). And, in many ways, this modern understanding of philosophy has greatly contributed to the misguided notion that philosophy is a purely western phenomena, a notion that intercultural philosophy necessarily puts into question through its practice. Thus, recovering this understanding of knowledge is, I believe, not only throughout necessary to do intercultural philosophy in a consequential way, as pointed out by Prazeres, but is also one of the most important contributions that intercultural philosophy can make to dealing with our current issues, philosophically and globally.
Prazeres (2024) argues, much in alignment with Mall’s ideas on intercultural philosophy, that one advantage of her methodology for intercultural philosophy, based on Nishitani’s concept of reciprocal interpenetration, is that it allows us to move past a substantialist, dualistic and subject-centered perspective, in such a way that would be necessary in other to fully promote the genuine connections between self and other that would be necessary for intercultural philosophy. Yet, one has to wonder: does that mean that intercultural philosophy should not engage with philosophies that are considered, according to this point of view, “substantialist”, “dualist” or “subject-centered”? Should the views of the philosophies classified as such not be taken seriously by intercultural philosophy?
It is here that, perhaps, lies my point of greater disagreement with Prazeres (2024). For, by conceiving her “metaphilosophical” point of view on intercultural philosophy based on the philosophy of Nishitani, she seems to take the point of view of his philosophy - and the tradition within which it is inserted - as the privileged point of view through which we should understand intercultural philosophy “in toto”. And, in doing so, I believe she unintentionally further propagates a sort of conception about “Western” philosophy - which seems to play a significant role in Nishitani’s philosophy - according to which this philosophy is “substantialist”, “individualistic”, “dualistic” etc. and has to be overcome by a point of view which negates all these characteristics - and which is to be provided by a certain “Eastern” philosophy. The problem, however, is that this results in a caricature not only of the so called “Western” philosophies, by attributing to them general classifications such as being “substantialist” and “dualistic”, but also of the very “substantialistic” and “dualistic” points of view as philosophically sustainable positions - which, one has to remember, exist beyond the so called “West”.
Thus, I believe that intercultural philosophy, not only on a philosophical level, but on a metaphilosophical level, cannot simply take as granted that substantialism and dualism are in and of themselves undesirable and philosophically to be rejected altogether. Rather, it has to take seriously those philosophical positions and recognize, even if critically, the contributions that they have made to philosophy, to its history, and even to intercultural and decolonial philosophy. Which is why I would like to conclude suggesting that, in order to fully articulate a methodology for intercultural philosophy, one has to include - as I have attempted elsewhere (Machado, 2022) -, on a metaphilosophical level, the contributions such philosophies brought to our understanding of the relationship between self and other.
References
- HADOT, P. O que é a filosofia antiga? Tradução: Dion Davi Macedo. São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 2004.
- MACHADO, L. N. Moving through non-essential commonalities: Dialectics as a method for intercultural philosophy. Tropos, v. 14, p. 142-171, 2022.
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PRAZERES, A. S. F. Breaking barriers in intercultural philosophy: the power of empathy and interrelationship. Trans/form/ação: Revista de Filosofia da Unesp, Marília, v. 47, n. 2, e02400274, 2024. Disponível em: https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/16100
» https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/16100
