Rural pension policy in Brazil: performance, challenges, and reform proposals

ABSTRACT

This article analyzes the differential treatment provided by Brazil’s pension policy to rural workers, an issue heightened by the recent pension reforms. By evaluating policy performance across coverage, adequacy, equity, and sustainability, the study identifies targeting inefficiencies, untapped potential for more effective poverty alleviation, inequitable redistributive outcomes, and significant sustainability challenges. The analysis also highlights issues in targeting beneficiaries and examines the rationale behind differentiated retirement ages. Building on these findings, the paper presents proposals to improve the pension policy’s design and assesses their expected impacts.

JEL Classification: H55; J26; I38; D63.

KEYWORDS:
Rural pension; old-age benefit; social security reform; redistribution; fiscal sustainability; social protection; Brazil

INTRODUCTION

The pension reform approved by the National Congress in 2019 (Constitutional Amendment 103/2019) introduced significant changes to the eligibility criteria for scheduled retirement under the urban national pension scheme for private workers (RGPS): (i) a unified retirement scheme for new entrants, with a minimum retirement age of 65 for men and 62 for women, and contribution periods of 20 and 15 years, respectively; and (ii) multiple transitional rules for old age and length-of-contribution retirement for those already insured at the time of the reform. However, no changes were made to rural pensions, as in previous constitutional reforms. Thus, retirement for rural workers continues to be granted at a minimum age of 60 for men and 55 for women, with a required contribution period (rural activity) of 15 years.

The outcome of the reform reflects a duality. On one hand, the introduction of a minimum retirement age for RGPS pensions is a significant advancement. On the other hand, politically and socially sensitive issues – such as rural pensions, the Individual Microentrepreneur (MEI), and the exclusion of state and municipal civil servants, as well as military pensions – were deliberately left out of the reform agenda. In the case of rural pensions, despite a range of proposals from the Executive Branch under various administrations, the topic encountered considerable political resistance, largely due to the strong representation of congressional delegations from the North and Northeast regions. These delegations are especially responsive to constituencies with high coverage of rural pension benefits.

The reform’s approval further expanded the differentiated treatment afforded to rural workers relative to urban workers under the RGPS: (i) minimum retirement ages that are reduced by 5 years for men and 7 years for women; and (ii) the possibility of retirement being granted based solely on proof of rural activity, without mandatory pension contributions.

This article contributes to the debate on rural pensions in Brazil by offering a comprehensive assessment of performance and policy design across multiple dimensions. Drawing on this diagnostic, it presents proposals to improve the policy framework. The discussion aims to foster analytical rigor and go beyond the superficial narratives often present in political discourse.

Following this introduction, the second section describes the general features of the differentiated treatment applied to rural pensions. The third section evaluates the rural pension system, and the fourth section presents proposals for improving pension policy design. The fifth section offers concluding remarks.

DIFFERENTIATED TREATMENT OF RURAL PENSIONS IN BRAZIL

Differentiated pension treatment for rural workers is not common in contemporary systems. Pension rules have converged in countries such as Germany, France, and Italy. In Latin America, apart from Brazil, only Ecuador and Mexico apply distinct rules to rural workers (Huang and Zhang, 2021; Ibrahim, 2011; Schwarzer, 2000).

While the inclusion of rural workers in Brazil’s pension system dates back to 1963, the 1988 Federal Constitution marked a turning point in (i) equalizing retirement access between urban and rural workers (allowing both spouses to receive the benefits); (ii) establishing differentiated treatment for rural workers in old-age pensions (minimum age reduced by 5 years); and (iii) setting the minimum wage (MW) as the floor for rural old-age pension benefits. Subsequent regulations defined three categories within rural pension contributors: rural employees, individual contributors, and rural special insured. The latter includes workers engaged in family-based economic activities, such as small-scale farmers and artisanal fishers.

Rural special insured individuals account for nearly all rural pension beneficiaries and are subject to three dimensions of differentiated treatment: (i) pension contributions based on a levy applied to the commercialization of production; (ii) eligibility based solely on proof of rural activity (presumed contributions); and (iii) the benefit set at the MW, regardless of actual contributions or income history (Beltrão et al., 2000; Delgado and Cardoso Jr., 1999; Schwarzer, 2000; Valadares and Galiza, 2016). The weak link between benefits and contributions characterizes rural pensions as a semi-contributory system (Ansiliero et al., 2023; Schwarzer, 2000).

The debate over differentiated treatment for rural workers centers on the horizontal redistributive role of pension policy: differentiated treatment among groups defined by gender, race, age, or family composition. There is no consensus in the literature, due to diverse political perspectives and value hierarchies (Barr, 2012; Sidone and Giambiagi, 2025). Regarding the reduced retirement age for rural workers, one view argues that compensation is warranted due to pre-existing inequities arising from adverse working conditions (long hours and physical strain). Another view considers it inappropriate for pension policy to serve as compensation, citing practical difficulties in defining the intervention’s scope and the risk of delaying policies that address the root causes of disparities.

Nonetheless, while the extent of redistributive action remains contested, there is consensus that pension policy should account for the specific vulnerabilities of rural workers and other social groups when clear disadvantages exist in terms of social risk coverage within the system.

PERFORMANCE AND DESIGN EVALUATION OF BRAZIL’S RURAL PENSION SYSTEM

The literature on pension system performance emphasizes the need to consider multiple policy dimensions – coverage, adequacy, equity and sustainability – to enable comprehensive assessment (Brown and Ip, 2000; ILO, 2017).

Coverage

Coverage refers to how effectively pension policy reaches the socially protected population. Between 1980 and 2023, the number of rural benefits grew at an average annual rate of 3.4%, whereas the population increased by 1.3% per year. Although comparing benefits and population figures is imprecise due to potential benefit accumulation, the literature on rural pension coverage expansion highlights easier access to rural old-age pensions and significant inclusion of women, following the rule change that allowed both spouses to receive benefits (Beltrão et al., 2000; Delgado and Cardoso Jr., 1999; Maranhão and Vieira Filho, 2018; Schwarzer, 2000).

Rural old-age pensions have been the main driver of rural benefit growth in recent decades, reaching 6.98 million in 2023 – 69.1% of all rural benefits – followed by survivor pensions (24.1%) and other benefits (6.8%). Rural old-age pensions account for about 30.6% of all old-age pensions (urban and rural), representing 55.4% of retirement-by-age benefits and 29.3% of survivor benefits. According to Ansiliero et al. (2023), among 66.8 million employed individuals covered by the public pension scheme in Brazil, about 5 million (7.5%) were classified as rural special insured.

The literature also explores the regional dimension of rural pensions, highlighting the high concentration of benefits in the Northeast, both relative to the total population (Figure 1a) and to the eligible age group (men aged 60+, women aged 55+) (Figure 1b). States such as Maranhão and Piauí exhibit coverage rates exceeding 70% of the eligible age group, followed by states in the North. In contrast, some Southeastern states, like Rio de Janeiro, report that only 2% of the eligible population receive rural pension benefits. This regional disparity fuels strong political resistance in Congress against proposals to reform rural pensions, especially from Northeast and North representatives.

Figure 1
Rural pension coverage in relation to the total population and eligible age group (a) in relation to the total population in 2020 (b) in relation to the eligible age group

The differentiated treatment for specific groups raises concerns about effective targeting of intended beneficiaries. Although available evidence does not allow categorical conclusions, several indicators point to targeting inefficiencies within the rural pension system.

The first indicator arises from the comparison between the estimated 4.5 million rural old-age pension and survivor beneficiaries residing in rural areas – based on microdata from the 2022 Continuous Brazilian National Household Survey (PNADC) published by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) – and the total of 9.7 million rural benefits recorded in administrative data. This discrepancy was previously noted by Maranhão and Vieira Filho (2018). Moreover, the 6.8 million rural pensions in 2022 exceeded the rural population of 5.3 million men and women aged 60 and 55 or older, respectively. These inconsistencies may be partially explained by the sample-nature of PNADC data, the definition of rural population based on residence (rural beneficiaries may reside in urban areas), and the imprecision in comparing benefits to beneficiaries due to potential benefit accumulation.

A second indicator is derived from the overestimated projection of 2.1 million rural old-age pension concessions between 2013 and 2023 – based on the total number of agricultural sector workers (PNADC, 2012) – in comparison with the 3.6 million actual concessions recorded in administrative data.

A third indicator concerns the substantial labor force participation among potential rural beneficiaries. This is a key consideration, as the presumed arduousness of rural work and expected early loss of labor capacity are used to justify lower retirement ages for rural workers (Paiva et al., 2018; Valadares and Galiza, 2016). Data indicate that approximately 50.9% of men aged 60-64 and 27.8% of women aged 55-61 in rural areas remain in the labor force. Even among rural residents receiving retirement or survivor benefits, labor force participation is significant: 40.1% of men aged 60-64 and 20.0% of women aged 55-61 report being in the labor force.

A fourth indicator of targeting issues emerges from the demographic profile of rural beneficiaries. The data for 2022 reveal that within the rural population, access to benefits is higher among individuals identifying as “White” or “Asian” compared to those identifying as “Brown”, “Black”, or “Indigenous”. For example, among men aged 60 and older, approximately 83.0% of whites received rural benefits, compared to 74.1%, 76.8%, and 74.0% for “Blacks”, “Browns”, and “Indigenous” individuals, respectively. Among women aged 55 and older, disparities were smaller, with the highest benefit rate among those identifying as “Asian” (78.5%), followed by “Whites”, “Browns”, and “Blacks” at 77.0%, 77.0%, and 75.7%, respectively. These biases have already been documented in the literature (Kreter and Bacha, 2006).

Finally, a fifth indicator of poor targeting is intrinsic to the rural worker group. The rural special insured, who access differentiated eligibility criteria (presumed contributions), are not necessarily the most socioeconomically vulnerable. In 2022, about 24.7% (2.1 million) of agricultural sector workers were employed without formal labor contracts (PNADC, 2022) – a group with greater socioeconomic vulnerability (Campos, 2006), limited labor rights, and the lowest per capita household income (BRL 848) among sector workers yet are required to prove actual pension contributions (Figure 2). In contrast, self-employed workers – including rural special insured – comprised 43.9% of the total (3.7 million) and a much higher per capita household income (BRL 1,259) than those without formal contracts.

Figure 2
Number of old-age beneficiaries (in thousands)

Therefore, while caution is warranted in interpreting these findings, they raise valid concerns regarding the targeting of the beneficiary population receiving differentiated treatment under Brazil’s rural pension system.

Adequacy

The adequacy dimension relates to how well the pension system achieves the objectives such as poverty alleviation, consumption smoothing (income replacement during inactivity), and social insurance. Adequacy is typically measured through indicators reflecting the level of social protection provided by the system.

The literature is unanimous in recognizing the importance of pensions in eradicating elderly poverty in rural areas, as well as in increasing household income, reducing rural inequalities, enhancing women’s participation, and generating significant economic effects in small municipalities (Beltrão et al., 2000; Delgado and Cardoso Jr., 1999; Schwarzer, 2000). The protection of the elderly against poverty has resulted from both expanded coverage and, more importantly, the establishment of the minimum wage (MW) as the floor for income-replacement pension benefits (old-age and survivor benefit). As a social achievement, Brazil has become one of the Latin American countries with the lowest rate of extreme poverty among the elderly (CEPAL, 2023).

However, policy evaluation must also consider the opportunity of resource allocation. In the context of poverty mitigation, most poverty in Brazil, in absolute terms, is concentrated in urban areas. Of the 65.4 million individuals in 2022 with a per capita household income up to 0.5 minimum wage, about 76.7% lived in urban areas. Among employed individuals earning below the poverty threshold, around 80.6% worked in sectors other than agriculture, livestock, forestry, fishing, and aquaculture. Many of these individuals lack either differentiated treatment or any form of pension protection.

Overall, rural workers have seen gains in education, formal employment, and earnings, accompanying structural changes in the rural sector over recent decades. Employment in agriculture and family farming has both declined relatively and absolutely (IBGE, 2023), especially in crops like rice, beans, cassava, and corn (Maranhão and Vieira Filho, 2018; Silva et al., 2023). Real average labor income in agriculture has also risen (IBGE, 2023); the number of agricultural workers in extreme poverty (per capita household income up to 0.25 MW) decreasing from 2.3 million (22.7% of the total) to about 1.2 million (13.9%) between 2012 and 2022.

Thus, the increasing proportion of potential rural beneficiaries who are no longer in poverty raises questions as to whether resources could be more effectively allocated to programs like Bolsa Família.

Equity

Equity in pension policy refers to the system’s ability to redistribute resources among individuals or groups. The empirical literature on Brazil demonstrates that the RGPS is progressive (Afonso et al., 2023). For rural pensions, beneficiaries enjoy high rates of return due to low contribution requirements. However, the structural underfunding of rural pensions results in substantial redistribution across society.

Since 1971, rural pensions have operated as a structural deficit subsystem, funded through urban-to-rural transfers within the RGPS or budgetary resources from general taxation (Schwarzer, 2000). This redistributive logic is seen by some as justified (Valadares and Galiza, 2016), while others consider it problematic (Delgado and Castro, 2003), especially because it allows poor urban workers to help finance rural pensions. In 2024, rural pension revenues reached BRL 8.1 billion (0.07% of GDP), covering only 4.1% of expenditures totaling BRL 197 billion (1.7% of GDP), while urban participants financed about 85% of their own costs. Therefore, rural pensions contribute disproportionately to the RGPS deficit, accounting for less than 1.3% of revenue and more than 21% of total expenditure.

The differentiated contribution rules for rural special insured – one factor in underfunding – can be justified by the link between their income and rural production, which is often unstable and seasonal (Ibrahim, 2011; Schwarzer, 2000). However, income irregularity also affects many urban workers, particularly with recent labor market deregulation.

Debates about rural pension underfunding must address the differentiated contribution treatment for sectors like agriculture, especially the reduced rates on the sale of agricultural production. Analysis of sectoral participation in RGPS funding shows that the rural sector’s low contribution levels. In 2019, pension and FGTS contributions represented 2.6% of Gross Value Added (GVA) for agriculture, livestock, forestry, and fishing – well below the national average of 8.7% (IBGE National Accounts). Agriculture also ranks among the lowest sectors in payroll contributions.

While these differences partly reflect sector-specific characteristics (labor intensity, wage levels, informality), they also result from pension contribution rules. Agriculture accounts for 12.4% of employment but only 1.5% of total pension and FGTS contributions. This pronounced inequality in financing imposes indirect costs – such as higher effective contribution rates on other sectors – and likely distorts relative prices and the allocation of resources across the economy.

Sustainability

The sustainability dimension assesses the long-term viability of the pension system, ensuring that it does not impose undue burdens on specific groups or undermine other public policy objectives. Amid structural funding fragility, rural pension expenditures as a share of GDP increased from 0.7% in 1997 to 1.7% in 2024. This rise reflects both quantity effects (expanded coverage and longer benefit duration due to increased life expectancy) and price effects, such as higher benefit values resulting from real minimum wage growth, a trend further exacerbated by sluggish economic growth.

Despite the 2019 reform, long-term projections reveal significant challenges for RGPS sustainability, mainly due to the rapid aging of the population. Official forecasts project RGPS expenditures to rise from 8.0% to 17.0% of GDP between 2025 and 2100 (PLDO, 2026). Rural pensions contribute substantially to this trend. Although rural pension spending (as a share of GDP) has declined in recent years, anticipated increases in benefit stock, real minimum wage increases, and moderate economic growth indicate a likely upward trajectory in rural pension expenditures.

Microdata from RGPS administrative records (December 2022) provides insight into the age structure of rural old-age pension beneficiaries (Figure 2). The average age of active pension beneficiaries was 71.1 years (72.2 for men, 70.3 for women), with a concentration near the minimum retirement ages. Notably, 218,000 beneficiaries were aged 90 or older, implying benefit durations of up to 35 years for women and 30 years for men.

The age distribution of beneficiaries enables the calculation of the accumulated liability – the present value of future benefits based on acquired rights. This metric, known as implicit pension debt in pay-as-you-go systems (Holzmann et al., 2001; Sidone et al., 2022), can be estimated using Equation 1. Here, the present value of benefits (PVB) represents the discounted value of future payments: V_ben denotes the average annual old-age benefit (BRL 17,160), while $Q_x^s$ and $E_x^s$ correspond to the number of beneficiaries and the remaining life expectancy at age x, respectively, for each sex s ∈ {M, W} (men and women). The resulting implicit pension liability for rural old-age benefits totaled BRL 1,725 trillion (2023 values), with approximately 67.2% attributed to female beneficiaries, reflecting both higher benefit shares and longer expected duration. Given the funding fragility of rural pensions, nearly all this liability – underestimated due to future concessions – is collectively borne by the population.

$PVB=V_{ben}\cdot {\displaystyle \sum _s{Q}_x^s\cdot E_x^s,\forall s\in \left\{M,W\right\}}$

Evaluation of Rural Pension Design

Beyond performance assessment, evaluating rural pension design requires attention to two key aspects: (i) the categorization of special insured individuals; and (ii) the eligibility conditions for retirement (qualifying period, proof of rural activity, and minimum age).

The practical difficulty in categorizing rural special insured individuals poses challenges for effective targeting. First, monitoring the restriction on hiring permanent employees in rural activities is complicated by widespread informal labor arrangements, which limit worker protection. Second, the property size limit of four fiscal modules introduces administrative complexity, due to the variation in unit sizes defined by INCRA across municipalities (ranging from 5 to 110 hectares) and judicial decisions against fixed land size thresholds based on outdated legal precedents. Third, the gradual relaxation of eligibility criteria has diluted the rural special insured category, allowing the inclusion of less vulnerable subgroups. Notable examples include allowance for family income from sources other than rural pensions (Law 11.718/2008); permission for participation in certain business partnerships (Law 12.873/2013); engagement in industrial, commercial, or service activities within the rural context; and registration as a microentrepreneur (MEI) or microenterprise with annual revenue of up to BRL 360,000 (Complementary Law 155/2016). The simultaneous classification of rural special insured as MEIs illustrates a dysfunction in pension coverage by allowing the accumulation of two heavily subsidized benefits, worsening known targeting and sustainability issues in the MEI system (Costanzi and Sidone, 2022).

The eligibility conditions for rural retirement also present design challenges. Law 8.213/1991 initially established a contribution requirement of 5 years for old-age benefits, allowing proof of rural activity in the five years preceding retirement application. This was later extended to a 15-year requirement, matching the general qualifying period. In 2008, rural employees were allowed to prove rural activity only up to 2010. From 2011 to 2020, a favorable service-time conversion mechanism allowed each month of rural employment to be multiplied by 2 or 3 for qualifying purposes. Since 2020, exclusive proof of rural activity for rural old-age benefit eligibility applies only to rural special insured individuals. Therefore, the so-called “boias-frias” – socioeconomically vulnerable rural laborers often mentioned in debates against rural pension reform – are not eligible for exclusive rural activity proof.

In addition to presumed contributions, proving rural activity for special insured individuals faces administrative and operational hurdles, contributing to high levels of judicialization (Maranhão and Vieira Filho, 2018; Valadares and Galiza, 2016). Provisional Measure 871/2019 (converted into Law 13.846/2019) prohibited the use of proof of rural activity through declarations issued by rural labor unions or fishing colonies, even if certified by the INSS – a measure that only partially addresses the issue. Despite this, judicial concessions increased, reaching 35.6% in 2023, with a peak of 51.2% in March of that year.

A second key design issue is the reduction of the minimum retirement age, the differentiated treatment of which is originally justified by two main arguments: (i) adverse working conditions; and (ii) early loss of labor capacity. Both arguments would suggest lower life expectancy for rural workers compared to the urban counterparts (Beltrão et al., 2000; Paiva et al., 2018; Schwarzer, 2000).

The first justification is rooted in the contested horizontal redistributive or compensatory role of pension policy. Even if such a role is accepted, its effectiveness is debatable for two main reasons: (i) the lack of uniformity in rural working conditions and significant improvements in rural living standards; and (ii) the existence of highly strenuous urban occupations (e.g. construction), whose workers, who are not compensated, still contribute to rural pension financing.

Setting aside the compensatory rationale, early retirement age could be justified by premature loss of labor capacity, resulting from early entry into rural work and high physical demands. Since retirement aims to protect individuals from the social risk of losing labor capacity in old age, early retirement is appropriate only for occupations with demonstrable harmful health effects – similar to special retirement schemes for workers exposed to hazardous agents (Amaral et al., 2019; Ibrahim, 2011). However, there is no empirical evidence of premature loss of work capacity among rural workers in Brazil. On the contrary, existing studies suggest that a significant share of rural retirees retain full labor capacity.

The hypothesis of lower life expectancy among rural workers also lacks empirical support. The significant difference reported by Valadares and Galiza (2016) was questioned on methodological grounds by Paiva et al. (2018), who found clear convergence in average cessation age between urban and rural beneficiaries, with results even favoring rural beneficiaries. More recent analyses confirm this trend, showing strong convergence in average age at death for urban and rural beneficiaries in both groups from 1999 to 2018 (Vizioli and Costanzi, 2022). Additional evidence indicates higher life expectancy among rural residents across all ages and both sexes (Albuquerque, 2019). Thus, empirical findings contradict claims of lower survival rates for rural workers.

PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING THE DESIGN OF BRAZIL’S RURAL PENSION POLICY

A comprehensive evaluation of Brazil’s rural pension system has led to several proposals to improve its design. First, a gradual convergence of retirement ages between the urban and rural old-age beneficiaries is recommended. This would reduce the current 5- and 7-year age gap for men and women, respectively, to just one year for existing RGPS beneficiaries and eliminate it for new entrants. For those already insured under the RGPS, the minimum rural retirement age would increase from 60 to 64 for men and from 55 to 61 for women, with increments of one year every three years – reaching those ages after 12 and 18 years, respectively. This adjustment would narrow the retirement age gap to one year (65/62 compared to 64/61) for current beneficiaries. For new entrants, the minimum retirement age would be 65 for men and 62 for women, eliminating differentiation by group.

These proposals reflect international trends toward limitation of special retirement schemes. Among OECD countries, 11 (including Australia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Iceland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) do not offer early retirement for hazardous or arduous occupations. Another four (Canada, Ireland, Israel, and the United States) limit special retirement to public safety workers such as police officers, firefighters, and military personnel (OECD, 2023).

From a sustainability perspective, approval of this proposal by the end of 2025 would reduce cumulative expenditure by BRL 900 billion over 30 years (2023 constant values), with BRL 499.4 billion from female and BRL 400.5 billion from male beneficiaries (Figure 3). Expenditure reductions would accelerate as transitional rules are replaced by permanent ones, and more benefits are granted under the new system. Over 50 years, cumulative savings would reach BRL 1.96 trillion – BRL 1.07 trillion for women old-age benefits and BRL 884.0 billion for men. Actuarially, the present value of the expenditure reduction would total BRL 1.0 trillion over 75 years (using a 3% discount rate), representing future savings discounted over time. These figures underscore significant social cost of the continued maintenance of reduced rural retirement ages. Thus, the proposal would alleviate RGPS sustainability pressures and would decrease the need for rural pension financing and its adverse redistributive effects.

Figure 3
Age Pyramid of Active Rural Old-age Beneficiaries in 2022

In addition to sustainability, other important aspects of pension policy should be considered. From a redistributive perspective, impacts would remain limited, as rural workers would still receive higher returns from the system compared to urban workers, largely due to lower contributions. In terms of coverage, the proposal does not change the qualification period for rural access, but simply postpones, rather than denies, eligibility for the benefit – thereby maintaining adequate social protection. Any early loss of labor capacity for workers under the new minimum retirement ages would be addressed through permanent disability retirement benefits.

Figure 4
Projected Expenditure Reduction from Rural-to-Urban Retirement Age Convergence (in BRL billions, 2023 values)

Regarding adequacy, no adverse impact on elderly poverty is anticipated since benefit values would remain the same. However, raising the retirement age could increase the poverty risk among non-elderly individuals between the current and new eligibility ages. This risk would be partially offset by improved working conditions and earnings among rural workers, as well as transitional provisions for individuals aged 50 and older who are nearing retirement. Any remaining risks could be addressed through complementary social assistance programs, such as Bolsa Família.

Second, restructuring the funding base of rural pensions is essential, particularly by adjusting contribution requirements for the agricultural sector. Without such reform, rural pensions will continue to diverge from a contributory model, potentially fueling proposals to convert them into non-contributory assistance programs like the BPC/Loas. Such a shift would be detrimental to rural workers’ social protection, as rural pensions provide an extra annual payment and cover a range of social risks, including survivor pensions, disability benefits, and maternity leave.

Strong political resistance to any changes in rural pensions is likely. A conciliatory approach could consist of allocating a portion of the resulting savings to initiatives that improve the social and economic conditions of informal agricultural workers. Examples include programs to rescue workers from exploitative or precarious conditions, and efforts to upgrade rural workforce skills for transitions to other sectors.

Third, enhancing the targeting of rural special insured and improving the quality of pension data registries are necessary for better policy management and more accurate allocation. Although Law 13.846/2019 tasked the Federal Government with maintaining an updated rural workers’ registry within the National Social Information Registry (CNIS) – intended as the sole criterion for verifying rural worker status – Constitutional Amendment 103/2019 delayed its implementation. To date, there is no confirmation that this registry is operational.

Finally, it is worth reconsidering the use of the economic sector (rural vs. urban) as a basis for differentiated treatment, especially given worker mobility across sectors during their careers. An alternative approach would be to target differentiated pension treatment based solely on poverty or income insufficiency (absolute or relative), regardless of economic activity. This would enhance equity among insured individuals.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The differentiated treatment granted to rural workers under Brazil’s 1988 Federal Constitution was a legitimate response to the socioeconomic conditions of the time. However, subsequent legislative developments have largely preserved this differentiation, despite profound demographic and socioeconomic changes.

Evaluation across multiple dimensions of rural pension performance reveals targeting inefficiencies, untapped potential for more effective poverty alleviation, inequitable redistributive effects, and significant sustainability challenges in the face of population aging. Policy design and implementation assessments also identified difficulties in the categorization of rural special insured individuals and verifying rural activity for benefit eligibility. Furthermore, the main arguments for reduced retirement ages were critically examined, and no compelling justification remains for maintaining such a differentiation.

In response, several proposals were put forward to improve the design of Brazil’s rural pension system. Chief among these is the gradual convergence of retirement ages for rural and urban workers, which would narrow the gap to one year for current RGPS beneficiaries and eliminate it for new entrants. The fiscal impact – estimated at BRL 1.96 trillion in savings over 50 years – highlights the social cost of maintaining reduced retirement ages. The partial allocation of these savings to initiatives to support rural workers’ living conditions was also recommended.

Other potential impacts on equity, coverage, and adequacy were also examined. Additional proposals include restructuring the funding base of rural pensions – especially by recalibrating agricultural sector contributions – and improving both the targeting of rural special insured individuals and the quality of pension data.

Data availability statement

The research data is only available upon request.

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• Editor responsible for the evaluation process:
  Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira

Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  10 July 2026
• Date of issue
  2026

History

• Received
  25 Nov 2024
• Accepted
  18 Aug 2025