BICAMERALISM AND EXECUTIVE PROVISIONAL MEASURES: THE ROLE OF FEDERAL SENATE AS AN INSTITUTIONAL ACTOR WITH VETO POWER

This article aims to analyze the role of the Federal Senate as a second chamber in the processing of provisional measures, considering the characteristics of Brazilian bicameralism and presidentialism. To achieve this goal, we use the theoretical framework of the bicameral model, coalition presidentialism and institutional actors with veto power, and we carry out empirical research, predominantly quantitative, based on the collection and analysis of data on the processing of provisional measures presented in the period from 2010 to 2020, especially the processing time in the joint committee and in the plenary of each chamber and the success, rejection and amendment rates of the provisional measures, in this case by the Senate, as a second chamber. These data are analyzed and compared with results from previous studies on bicameral interaction and coalition presidentialism. In the end, it is concluded that the Federal Senate introduces the interests it represents into the decision-making process, especially since most of the processing time for provisional measures takes place in joint committees, where the actions of the houses are more symmetrical, and exercises its constitutional powers as a reviewing house and, when necessary, exercises veto power (obstruction).

Keywords
Provisional measures; bicameralism; processing time; veto power; Federal Senate