Legislative override and the provisional last word: expressions of institutional dialogue or supremacy between powers?

The article investigates the limits and forms of interaction between the Federal Supreme Court (STF) and the National Congress in Brazil, focusing on legislative override and the theory of the last provisional word. The problem lies in understanding whether such phenomena express an effective institutional dialogue or reveal disputes over interpretive supremacy of the Constitution. The aim is to critically examine these categories in the context of the Brazilian constitutional model, which is marked by the absence of binding legislative decisions by the STF in abstract constitutional control. The method adopted was a literature review and critical analysis of the topic based on the Brazilian experience, considering both Brazilian and foreign authors. It is concluded that legislative override does not constitute institutional dialogue, but rather a stage of the constitutional process linked to legislative independence and conditioned by political factors, so that the mechanisms of interaction between powers are contingent and do not guarantee a dialogical model. The theory of the last provisional word affirms the absence of an interpretative monopoly and offers a dynamic vision of constitutional interpretation, defined by the power challenged last, although it does not resolve issues pointed out by critics such as interpretative anarchy or the absence of definitive criteria for closing constitutional disputes.

Keywords:
legislative override; provisional last word; institutional dialogue; interpretive supremacy.