Open-access A Note on Auctions with Compulsory Partnership*

Abstract

We study a symmetric, profit share, common value auction with a twist: One (fixed) Bidder, if not winning the auction, has to enter a partnership with the winner, sharing both expenses and revenue at rate (say) 0 < λ < 1. We show that it doesn't have an equilibrium in pure-strategies.

Keywords:
Pre-Salt Auction; Production Share; Equilibrium Existence


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