Greenspan’s contributions on affect and transference at pre-representational levels

This article analyzes Stanley Greenspan’s proposition about certain patients who, due to deficits in so-called structural capacities, would not be able be unable to elaborate and differentiate mental representations in the context of transference dynamics. We start by assuming that these capacities need to be evaluated during psychic treatment based on Greenspan’s understanding of the affect function in the transference relationship. Based on comparisons with Freudian conceptions of affect and transference, Greenspan’s proposal is explored in its clinical and theoretical implications. As a result, we highlight the contributions of the DIR/Floortime model’s creator on affect as the sensory organizer capable of providing intention to actions and connecting the dimensions of human experience that support emotional and intellectual development at more complex levels.

Keywords:
developmental psychology; psychoanalysis; affect; transference; representations.