“A Matter of Chance”: An Epistemological Interpretation of Chance in Radical BehaviorismAbstract
The concept of chance cited by B. F. Skinner was not subject to a detailed examination to elucidate changes in his explanatory system. This article explains and discusses the meanings of chance identified in the author’s texts. Skinner approached it in two different ways. First, is taken to be incompatible with the process of producing scientific knowledge, as it is characterized as antagonistic to achieving the desiderata of behavioral science (laws, prediction, and control). In the second, chance is compatible with Skinnerian science when the concept is inserted in the explanation of the evolution of behavior in terms of variation and selection. The results endorse epistemological shifts towards selectionistic and indeterministic conceptions of science in Skinner.
Keywords:
chance; radical behaviorism; variation; selectionism; indeterminism
Resumo
O conceito de acaso citado por B. F. Skinner não foi alvo de exame pormenorizado para elucidar mudanças que ocorreram em seu sistema explicativo. O objetivo do artigo é explicitar e discutir as acepções de acaso identificadas em textos do autor. A análise evidenciou duas formas distintas de Skinner abordar o acaso. Na primeira, evidencia-se a incompatibilidade do acaso com a produção do conhecimento científico, na medida em que se tipifica como antagônico aos desideratos da ciência comportamental (leis, previsão e controle). Na segunda, o acaso é compatível com a ciência skinneriana quando inserido na explicação da evolução do comportamento em termos de variação e seleção. Os resultados consubstanciam mudanças epistemológicas em direção a concepções selecionistas e indeterministas de ciência em Skinner.
Palavras-chave:
acaso; comportamentalismo radical; variação; selecionismo; indeterminismo
One of the aims of science is to provide explanations for phenomena of interest. In general terms, a scientific explanation is defined by the search for the causes of these phenomena - not just any type of causes, but those that can be investigated empirically, described by logically and theoretically consistent statements, and that have passed the scrutiny of criticism by the scientific community (Hempel, 1965; Mackie, 1974; Salmon, 1998). To scientifically explain a phenomenon is to connect the events that typify it to other events, describing a causal dependence relationship between them. More than highlighting episodic or isolated connections, a scientific explanation seeks to describe regular causal dependency relationships between types of events, some of which reach the status of scientific laws, that guide the prediction of the occurrence of similar events in the future (Bacon, 1620/1979; Laplace, 1814/1951; Mill, 1881/1950)1.
It turns out that not all events are connected to one another, and the occurrence of some is characterized as a deviation from causal regularities. The term “chance” precisely describes this aspect: a relationship of causal independence between events (Lestienne, 2008). According to Ferrater Mora (2004), the casual (accidental) “. . . is fortuitous and contingent, and may or may not exist” (p. 42); understood in this way, “. . . it must be recognized that science - whether by giving preferential attention to essences or natures, whether by trying to explain what is necessarily as it is, whether by emphasizing the universal or the law - tends to avoid the accidental” (p. 42, italics added).
If scientific explanation can be characterized by demonstrating relationships of causal dependence between events, chance would specify the limits of this explanation, constituting a kind of break with antecedent causes (Lestienne, 2008). In fact, those events that are casual are: “. . . not determined by any cause. For this very reason, they constitute the natural limit of determinism, the endpoint . . . of all causal chains we can reconstruct” (Lestienne, 2008, p. 41).
In the philosophy of science, the notion of chance has given rise to heated discussions at both the ontological and epistemological levels. In the ontological domain, this notion figured in the dispute between deterministic and indeterministic conceptions of the world (cf. Bohr, 1935; Einstein, Podolsky & Rosen, 1935; Heisenberg, 1971/2000; Monod, 1970; Popper, 1956/1988). For determinists, the world is made up of strict causal relationships, with no room for chance (Laplace, 1814/1951). Thus, the occurrences of all events in the world are instances of causal laws, and any deviations or disturbances in causal regularities are understood as cognitive limitations and not as chance; therefore, the possibility of causal independence between events is denied. For indeterminists, there are regularities in the world, but they are probabilistic and not deterministic; thus, laws suffer deviations (even if infinitesimal), which allows the emergence of novelty in the world (Peirce, 1892/1992). Another way of denying determinism is to admit that the occurrence of at least one event is not an instance of a causal law; as Popper (1965/1975) argues, indeterminism would be: “. . . the doctrine that not all events in the physical world are predetermined with absolute precision, in all their infinitesimal details” (p. 220, author’s italics).
In epistemology, there are also different positions regarding chance. In one of them, producing scientific knowledge about a given phenomenon involves eliminating chance through apparatus, tools, and methodological and analytical resources (e.g., statistical analyses). Here, causality becomes equal to the fulfillment of scientific predictions (Schlick, 1931/1988). From this perspective, scientifically explaining a given event by indicating its causes, by definition, cannot involve chance (Laplace, 1814/1951). Even if one admits, in the ontological sense, the existence of chance in the world, in the production of scientific knowledge, chance would have no cognitive value; that is, events that happen by chance do not allow for scientific knowledge of the phenomenon, because knowing or explaining means connecting one event to another in a regular way, allowing predictions (Schlick, 1931/1988).
On the other hand, there are also epistemological conceptions in which the notion of chance seems to be part of the production of scientific knowledge, forming part of, and not being eliminated from, this process. Therefore, inferences based on statistical laws, for example, can be considered legitimate explanations (Laurenti, 2009b). The formulation of the laws involves investigating regularities described in probabilistic terms, and therefore, notions such as probability, variation, or chance itself gain a place in scientific epistemology (Heisenberg, 1958/1999; Lestienne, 2008; Lüthy & Palmerino, 2016; Mayr, 2004; Morin, 2000; Popper, 1956/1988; Stamos, 2010). An emblematic example is present in the quantum revolution in the physical sciences. Chance becomes an important concept to the extent that “... the view of the universe with strict causal laws was replaced at the subatomic level with statistical laws” (Stamos, 2010, p. 838). The consideration of chance also occurs in Darwinian selection theory: “The refutation of strict determinism and of the possibility of absolute prediction freed the way for the study of variation and of chance phenomena, so important in biology” (Mayr, 2004, p. 27).
The issue of chance is also present in Radical Behaviorism, the philosophy of Behavior Analysis, whose main proponent was B. F. Skinner (1904-1990). Different propositions regarding behavior as an object of study and how to scientifically explain this object gave rise to different interpretations of the philosophical commitments of Skinner's scientific theory (Abib, 1999; Laurenti, 2008, 2009b, 2012; Lopes, Laurenti, & Abib, 2018; Micheletto, 1999; Moxley, 1997 a , 1997b, 2004, 2007; Sério, Andery & Micheletto, 2005). For example, in the 1930s, the initial period of this author’s publications, the definition and model for explaining behavior were guided by principles and concepts originating from the physical sciences (e.g., functional relationships) (Laurenti, 2009b; Micheletto, 1999; Moxley, 1997a, 1997b, 2007; Sério, Andery & Micheletto, 2005). On the other hand, from the late 1960s onwards, parallels and references to the selectionist assumptions of the theory of evolution by natural selection (e.g., variation and selection) began to be used more frequently by Skinner to define and explain behavior (Laurenti, 2009a; Micheletto, 1999; Moxley, 1997a, 1997b, 2007; Skinner, 1981).
To understand these changes, different concepts have been invoked (e.g., determinism, indeterminism, mechanism, physicalism, selectionism, probabilism) (Cruz & Cillo, 2008; Laurenti, 2008, 2009b; Moxley, 2007; Reis, 2020). However, to date, the notion of chance, the pivot of epistemological discussions in the physical and biological sciences, has been little discussed as a central theme within the scope of radical behaviorism (see Leão, Laurenti & Haydu, 2016; Moxley, 1997a, 1997b, 2007), despite having been mentioned by Skinner throughout his writings.
Thus, this article aims to make explicit and discuss the uses of the concept of chance found at different moments in Skinner's work. This conceptual investigation will show that, at least in the epistemological sphere, the privileged dimension in this study, the notion of chance, ceases to be incompatible with behavior-analytic scientific production in the period in which Skinnerian commitments to selectionism become more evident. With this examination, we hope to deepen conceptual studies regarding Skinner's work, providing other theoretical elements for the elucidation of his philosophical assumptions.
Method
This is a conceptual study focused on examining the notion of chance in Skinner's books. The selection of works was guided by the list of Skinnerian publications organized by Andery, Micheletto, and Sério (2004) and covered the period from the 1930s to the 1980s2. Nineteen books by Skinner were consulted.
Skinner's references to the concept were mapped by identifying the term chance in the books consulted. The search was carried out in digital format (PDF) books, using the electronic search feature in this type of document to directly identify the concept in the body of the text (Laurenti & Lopes, 2016).
A spreadsheet was created for each of the books examined. The spreadsheets consisted of three columns, each containing the indication of the book or text selected, the transcription of the passage(s) in which the keyword was found, and an interpretative comment regarding Skinner's use or description of the term.
After compiling the data in the spreadsheets, the analysis was carried out. This was initially guided by the inquiry regarding the argumentative context in which the author uses or describes chance and how it is used or described. With this, it was possible to systematize the meanings of chance reported by Skinner in the texts examined (see Table 1). After completing that systematization, the meanings of chance could be grouped into broader thematic categories. Based on this grouping, the differences in the argumentative contexts of using the term chance were explained, followed by a discussion of the epistemological implications of these differences.
Results and Discussion
Chart 1 presents the most representative occurrences of the epistemological dimensions of the concept of chance identified in the Skinnerian works analyzed, totaling 11 texts.
The conceptual analysis resulted in grouping the meanings of chance into two main categories. Some passages indicate incompatibilities of the notion of chance with the process of producing scientific knowledge about behavior. These passages are presented and discussed in the item Incompatibilities of the notion of chance with Skinnerian science. However, other excerpts were also identified that suggest changes towards the compatibility of chance with the production of knowledge about behavior, and these are described and examined in the item Compatibilities of the notion of chance with Skinnerian science. The presentation of the meanings found in each of the categories is followed by a discussion in which some implications for understanding the philosophical commitments of Behavior Analysis are outlined.
Incompatibilities of the notion of chance with the Skinnerian scientific perspective
The following excerpts highlight the impossibility of reconciling chance with behavior-analytic science. In general, Skinner seems to strive to indicate the antagonism between the formulation of laws and absolute prediction and control and chance. Whether within or outside the experimental context, this category signals the incompatibility between chance and the goals of Skinnerian science.
The first use of the term chance identified in the sample of selected Skinnerian texts describes chance as a (i) range of uncertainty regarding the effects of unknown or unmanipulated variables on behavior in the context of the experimental investigation of operant discrimination responses. Chance designates the lack of knowledge of variables or stimulating forces that may be controlling responses in an experimental situation (Skinner, 1938):
Before the reinforcement in the presence of Sd has had any effect, the ‘latency’ [understood as the elapsed time between the presentation of the Sd and the emission of the responses] will be a matter of chance and will depend upon the average rate of responding at the time. (Skinner, 1938, p. 197, italics added)
The term appears to describe a distribution of responses (prior to reinforcement in the presence of Sd) that occurs as a function of controlling variables to which the organism is exposed prior to the execution of the discrimination procedure. It is admitted that it is not possible to identify all of the variables in this specific situation.
Another use highlights the participation of variables that are difficult to detect in determining one response over another in a situation in which both appear to have an equal probability of occurring. The example examined by Skinner (1942/1999) to illustrate this use of the term chance was the behavior of guessing the outcome of a coin toss. Despite the existence of circumstances that strengthen one response (guessing in a coin toss, for example) over another (Skinner, 1942/1999), when the response probabilities are similar, no contingency evidently determines the emission of any response before a coin toss is made. In this example, chance seems to describe a (ii) specific control of variables of lesser magnitude (unknown) in the control of behavior (verbal, guessing, in the case referred to here) in relation to those of greater magnitude (Skinner, 1942/1999):
The first guess in a series of five [coin tosses] . . . is apparently controlled by an abiding preference, by biased preliminary conditions, or by trivial circumstances which cancel out in the long run and are spoken of as “chance.” (Skinner, 1942/1999, p. 455, italics added)
Similarly, chance can be understood as an (iii) impossibility of identifying controlling variables in intermittent reinforcement contingencies (Skinner, 1953). According to Skinner (1953), the determination of intermittent reinforcement contingencies is sufficiently remote to produce an effect of apparent indeterminacy: “A given consequence may depend upon a series of events which are not easily predicted. We do not always win at cards or dice because the contingencies are so remotely determined that we call them “chance”.” (p. 99, italics added). This is a use of chance that, once again, specifies the possibility of interference by certain variables that do not have a relationship of dependence with the phenomenon being investigated. The example of intermittent reinforcement illustrates this same principle in another way. Although, in this reinforcement scheme, the occurrence of the consequence depends on the occurrence of the response, the fact that responses do not always produce the consequence may suggest that the occurrence of the consequence occurred by chance, that is, independently of the occurrence of the response in question, and dependent on other “unknown” variables; hence its apparent effect of indeterminacy.
In other texts, Skinner (1953, 1957) uses the term chance as a synonym for (iv) coincidence (a relationship of contiguity between non-functionally related events). According to him, contiguous events do not explain behavior - because they are not causally or functionally related to behavior - but they can control it because they occur immediately and with some frequency (Skinner, 1953). Astral predictions, for example, are vague enough that adherents continue to take them for granted: “Failures [in astral predictions, etc.] are easily overlooked, while an occasional chance hit is dramatic enough to maintain the behavior of the devotee in considerable strength” (Skinner, 1953, p. 24).
Chance also denotes, therefore, relationships of contiguity between events, showing that they cannot constitute a scientific explanation (Skinner, 1953), and this comes to the fore again in the study of superstitious mands (Skinner, 1957), controlled by a “spurious” correlation (Skinner, 1953, p. 24) of variables: “Experimental study of nonverbal behavior has shown that merely intermittent reinforcement, such as that provided by chance throws of seven [with dice] at random, is sufficient to maintain a response [of the player] in strength” (Skinner, 1957, p. 47, italics added). Even though the behavioral process arising from intermittent reinforcement contingencies is not chaotic, from the organism's point of view, certain types of mands produced sufficient reinforcing consequences to maintain this type of strong response in its repertoire.
Skinner (1953) also examined the formation of the concept of chance. For him, the concept of chance is (v) a product of the process of abstraction of stimuli from the property of uncertainty or non-predictability of nature (Skinner, 1953). Skinner (1953) stated that the property of stimuli known as indeterminacy arose through a gradual process of abstraction:
Verbal behavior . . . has succeeded in isolating more and more subtle properties of nature . . . The word “chance,” for example, comes from a word which referred to the fall of a die or coin. A conspicuous feature of such an event is the indeterminacy of other events in which nothing falls . . . [so] the term [chance] comes under the control of a very special property of nature, the modern referent of the word “chance.” (p. 136, italics added)
Another use of chance is as a synonym for (vi) accident or lack of planning (Skinner, 1955/1999, 1961/1999). According to Skinner (1955/1999), his proposal for a planned society, embodied in the work of fiction Walden Two, was criticized for allegedly threatening freedom by eliminating the occurrence of accidents with planning. In the author’s words: “The [alleged] great crime of the founder of Walden Two . . . was the destruction of the possibility of the happy chance” (Skinner, 1955/1999, p. 22, italics added). Skinner rejected the view that accidents are necessarily virtuous and that planning is inherently bad. On the one hand, he argued, should we reject the synthetic fiber industry because it makes unnecessary the (happy) accidental evolutionary processes that produced materials such as wool and cotton? On the other hand, accidents can be both happy and unhappy, and even if they were only “happy,” waiting for them to produce useful novelties does not seem appropriate because this may take a long time to happen (Skinner, 1955/1999).
The opposition between chance and planning is also evident when Skinner (1961/1999) discussed the importance of teaching planning:
When multiple-choice apparatuses were first used, the organism was left to proceed by “trial and error.” The term does not refer to a behavioral process but simply to the fact that contingencies of reinforcement were left to chance: some responses happened to be successful and others not. (Skinner, 1961/1999, p. 233, italics added)
From a Skinnerian perspective, teaching involves planning. Therefore, little learning could occur if both the occurrence of relevant responses and their reinforcement were left to chance (Skinner, 1961/1999).
The excerpts exemplify, in different ways, the incompatibility between the occurrence of random phenomena and the scientific desiderata of behaviorist psychology (e.g., obtaining laws, prediction, and control). The first Skinnerian mentions of the term - (i), (ii), and (iii) - suggest that chance denotes independence between events, something antithetical to obtaining laws based on the empirical demonstration of the regular relationship of dependence between environment and responses (Skinner, 1938). In effect, the proposal of a scientific psychology guided by the study of behavior would only be feasible through such a demonstration. Thus, it would be necessary to guarantee an experimental control capable of confirming statements that the regular changes between observable events investigated were not being caused by variables other than those manipulated in the experiment.
From this perspective, it would be necessary to define empirical criteria that would allow us to attest that the occurrence of the investigated responses did not occur independently (i.e., by chance) of the manipulation of the variables of interest. For example, the “entry” of chance into an experiment could occur due to a failure in the control of variables. Occurrences of responses could be caused by strange, unknown, or difficult-to-detect variables using the available technical devices and not by independent variables. Even though it is difficult to establish control over all variables in an experiment, it would be possible to determine, through graphical records (e.g., cumulative records), mathematical and statistical data, parameters that define the occurrence of random responses, and the occurrence of responses linked to planned changes in the independent variables.
Such incompatibilities between chance and the Skinnerian scientific perspective were highlighted in excerpts from texts dating from the 1930s (Skinner, 1938) and 1940s (Skinner, 1942/1999), which characterize a period in which behaviorism declared epistemological affinities with determinism, where a vision of an inexorably fixed and immutable universe predominates, with universal laws and necessary and sufficient causal relationships between events (Moxley, 1997 a , 1997b, 2007). During this time, Skinner's main task was to demonstrate that behavior is a subject matter that can be studied scientifically. In the author’s words: “. . . we must adopt the fundamental postulate that human behavior is a lawful datum, that it is undisturbed by the capricious acts of any free agent . . . that it is completely determined” (Skinner, 1947/1999, p. 345, italics addedThis passage also illustrates the Skinnerian framework's commitment to epistemological systems inspired by the physical sciences (Micheletto, 1999), for some of which determinism was a necessary condition for doing science (see Laurenti, 2023). At the beginning of the 1940s, Skinner (1942/1999) was still aligned with this task.
However, Skinner also understands chance as a synonym for coincidence (iv), opposing the description of functional relationships that attest to contingency, not just the contiguity between responses and certain consequences (Skinner, 1953). Furthermore, chance is interchanged with uncertainty and unpredictability (v), notions that are at odds with the objective of predicting behavior (Skinner, 1953, 1957) but explained from a behavior-analytic perspective. Chance is also equated by Skinner (1955/1999, 1961/1999) with accident and lack of planning, which contradicts behavioral science's control claims. Since it is not possible to produce scientific knowledge about a phenomenon that occurs by chance, it is necessary to improve scientific investigative tools and apparatus for demonstrating dependent relationships between events, as well as to invest in increasingly effective planning strategies in different social contexts (Skinner, 1953, 1957, 1955/1999, 1961/1999).
Uses (iv), (v), and (vi) show that incompatibilities were also found outside the experimental context. If, in addition to explaining behavior through laws, one of the aims of science is to control the phenomenon of interest, Skinner sought to break free from chance by proposing the planning of reinforcement contingencies in teaching situations, in addition to the planning of cultural practices in interventions aimed at cultural evolution. Just as in the experimental laboratory context, in the applied context, chance antagonizes the proposal of a science of behavior that aims to control behavior and practices through planning.
In fact, in the 1950s and early 1960s, Skinner made explicit his proposal to create a science of behavior, with the aim of explaining different phenomena concerning human life, especially in Science and human behavior and in Verbal behavior (Skinner, 1953, 1957). Even separating operant from reflex (see Skinner, 1953) and making more systematic use of other notions, such as probability and triple contingency (Laurenti, 2008, 2009b; Moxley, 1997 a , 1997b, 2002, 2007) to understand human behavior, the chance was still described based on terms (e.g., coincidence, uncertainty, unpredictability) that marked its incompatibility with the desiderata of a science of human behavior (explanation, prediction, and control) (Skinner, 1953, 1955/1999, 1957, 1961/1999). Later, however, this scenario changes.
Compatibility of the notion of chance with the Skinnerian scientific perspective
This category highlights the shifts in how behavior-analytic science approaches the concept of chance. In contrast to the previous section, Skinner employs the term “chance” to align with scientific objectives. The compatibility between chance and Behavior Analysis becomes evident when the author begins to more explicitly adopt a selectionist scientific model.
In the context in which he is discussing the origin of new behaviors, Skinner (1968) admitted that some occurrences of human behavior occur independently of their connection with specific environmental and genetic variables, but that, even so, cannot be attributed to the activity of a creative mind:
. . . some instances of behavior cannot be traced to either genetic endowment or environmental history and . . . are therefore original in a special sense . . . Each of the responses composing that repertoire [of modern man] must have occurred at least once when it was not being transmitted as part of a culture. (p. 179, italics added)
If the occurrence of new responses could not be attributed to the environment and genetics, “where could it have come from if not from a creative mind?” Skinner (1968, p. 179) quips. The author’s response invokes “chance” to challenge the argument that the impossibility of traceability to those variables was evidence of the action of a mind. For Skinner (1968), then, instead of a creative mind, “New responses are generated by accidental arrangements of variables as unforeseeable as the accidental arrangements of molecules or genes . . . [they can] be traced to a kind of fortuitous programming of the necessary contingencies” (p. 180, italics added).
The participation of the concept of chance in Skinner's elucidation of the origin of new behaviors becomes more evident when the author establishes parallels with the evolution of species (Skinner, 1970/1999):
The diversity was once attributed to the whims and vagaries of a creative Mind, but Darwin proposed an alternative explanation. The word “origin” in The Origin of Species is important, for the book is essentially a study of originality. The multiplicity of living forms is accounted for in terms of mutation and selection . . . There are comparable elements in the behavior of the artist who produces original works. (p. 385, author’s italics).
New species arise from the selection of variations over time. Similarly, new behaviors can arise from the selection of “mutations” or accidental variations in behavior over the life history of an individual (see Skinner, 1974, p. 114).
Skinner (1974) also used the notion of chance to dispense with mentalism in understanding the great creative achievements of human beings, a resource considered questionable for so-called deterministic systems, whether religious or scientific:
That chance can play a part in the production of anything as important as mathematics, science, or art has often been questioned. Moreover, at first glance, there seems to be no room for chance in any completely determined system. The Church, in its belief in a predestined master plan, censured Montaigne for using words like fortune and nature, and if Saint Augustine sought heavenly counsel by opening his Bible and reading the first words that met his eyes, it was only because they did not meet his eyes by chance. Another deterministic system, psychoanalysis, had initiated another age in which chance is taboo; for the strict Freudian, no one can forget an appointment, call a person by the wrong name or make a slip of the tongue by chance. Yet the biographies of writers, composers, artists, scientists, mathematicians, and inventors all reveal the importance of happy accidents in the production of original behavior. (Skinner, 1974, p. 114, italics added)
Skinner (1974), moreover, used chance to reject the teleological meaning of planning traditionally used to explain the evolution of species, which the theory of evolution by natural selection opposed: “A still prevalent misunderstanding of evolution is the belief that an animal or plant changes in order to better adapt to its environment; e.g., that it develops an eye for the purpose of seeing” (Skinner, 1974, p. 57, italics added). According to him, the variations or mutations that serve as material for selection are random or haphazard and not directed toward the satisfaction of a design, such as adaptation or perfection. Genetic variations, therefore, do not occur to promote adaptation, but those organisms that happened to exhibit variations useful in the circumstances prevailing at the time had a better chance of surviving. In his words: “Since mutation is a random process and since most mutations are harmful rather than neutral or beneficial to the organism, it is evident that the occurrence of a variation is itself a matter of chance” (Skinner, 1974, p. 57, italics added). Behavioral variations, in turn, also cannot be understood as “. . . a will or purpose on the part of the individual to develop a new structure or trait that might prove helpful” (Skinner, 1974, p. 57). In contrast, “. . . the topographies of response selected by reinforcement are, if not random, at least not necessarily related to the contingencies under which they will be selected” (Skinner, 1974, p. 114).
By contrasting the notion of chance with the teleological conception of planning, Skinner did not abandon planning per se. He sought to reconcile chance and planning in the proposal of an “artificial evolution,” in which planning would aim to maximize the production of variations or mutations. The logic behind the seemingly paradoxical combination of chance and design seems to be this: if evolution occurs by random selection of variations, then if one wants to accelerate change (or evolution), one must encourage variations. It is, therefore, a matter of mimicking chance, maximizing the possibility of fortuitous arrangements among different variables:
The role of chance may be taken over and extended by deliberate design. Scientists create molecules by arranging conditions which could conceivably never arise fortuitously; genetic material can be deliberately altered through measures which do not closely resemble natural causes of mutations; and new forms of behavior can be generated by environmental contingencies which would be unlikely to arise by accident. (Skinner, 1968, p. 180, italics added)
Using the same strategy, individuals themselves can deliberately make environmental arrangements that increase the probability of the emergence of behavioral variations in their repertoire. One can “. . . learn not only to take advantage of accidents . . . but to produce them. He [the individual] can generate new ideas by, for example, arbitrarily rearranging words [making the stimulus control less precise]” (Skinner, 1968, p. 180). In another passage, Skinner (1968) details the mimicry of chance:
Mutations may be made more probable by making the control of a medium less precise or by encouraging disturbances . . . He [the artist] can generate [behavioral] mutations by changing his working conditions, by working when he is tired, cold, discouraged, or drunk. He can generate other kinds of mutations by deliberately doing what he has been taught not to do; he can violate standards, conventions, and taboos, as a mathematician denies self-evident axioms or as a composer uses previously forbidden harmonies. (Skinner, 1970/1999, p. 386)
Once the individuals have prepared the environment, a selection process can follow to strengthen new or original responses, and the persons themselves can do this by keeping some traces, lines, drawings, or images and discarding others (see Skinner, 1970/1999, p. 386), making room for the selection of original responses. As Skinner stated (1970/1999): “The picture eventually left on the canvas [in the case of a painting] is only the product of the combined processes of mutation [variation] and selection” (p. 386).
The combination of chance and planning is embodied in the oxymoron “planned diversification,” a strategy proposed by Skinner (1971) to accelerate cultural evolution. For the author, a culture must be prepared for change, just as it must prepare its members to live with change. In this sense, planning a culture means considering stability and deviations (Skinner, 1971).
As a planned culture is not synonymous with uniformity, one should not try to circumvent the possibility of (unpredictable) accidents in this process; on the contrary, variety and unpredictability are valued: “The only hope is planned diversification, in which the importance of variety is recognized” (Skinner, 1971, p. 159, author’s italics). From this perspective, planning a culture can also mean encouraging accidents or deviations, increasing the chances of beneficial variations in cultural practices (Skinner, 1971).
As with species and behavior, the “artificial evolution” of a culture depends on cultural planning. Far from regimenting itself, seeking to eliminate deviations or accidents given by chance, cultural planning can mimic it, deliberately inserting variations in practices with the intention of catalyzing changes in cultural practices:
We should be able to introduce variations (rather than waiting for them to occur by chance) or to change the contingencies of selection . . . People routinely change cultures by introducing new practices as variations to be selected. Rather than waiting for further variation and selection to solve our problem, can we not design a way of life that will have a better chance of a future? (Skinner, 1987, p. 8, italics added, author’s italics)
The reasoning applied to ontogenesis (e.g., Skinner, 1968, 1970/1999, 1974), therefore, extends to the evolution of cultures (Skinner, 1971, 1987). According to Skinner (1971), “a culture evolves as new practices [variations] appear and undergo selection, and we cannot wait for them to turn up by chance” (Skinner, 1971, p. 160, italics added). If evolution occurs through the selection of variations, and if variations are a condition for selection, then cultural planning interested in fostering the evolution (change) of cultures can use the planning of environments that play the role of chance, favoring the emergence of variations.
These excerpts demonstrate a change in how Skinner began to refer to chance within his scientific system. If, as illustrated in the previous section, Skinner's emphasis was on the antagonism between chance and science, in this section, the excerpts indicate that the notion of chance is considered to distance mentalism (creative mind) and teleology in the secular and scientific understanding of the evolution of behavior and cultures, similar to what Darwin did in explaining the origin of species through natural selection. The excerpts in this section also show that Skinner continues to understand chance as a relationship of independence, coincidence, unpredictability, and uncertainty. However, if this previously signaled the disagreement between chance and the production of scientific knowledge in a manner aligned with determinism, these excerpts suggest that Skinner began to invoke chance in his system to comprehend the origin of new behaviors (or creativity), in analogy to the elucidation of the evolution of species by natural selection. Chance also continues to be understood by Skinner as the opposite of planning. Nevertheless, he emphasized this distinction not to oppose the goal of controlling behavior but to differentiate teleological explanations from the evolution of behavior by introducing the concept of random variation. Skinner also maintains the synonymous relationship between chance and accident. Nevertheless, if accident and planning were previously irreconcilable notions, Skinner now combines them in the proposal to accelerate cultural evolution through planned diversification.
The new treatment of chance in behavioral science coincides with an epistemological change - initiated in the late 1960s - in which Skinnerian science begins to commit to the Darwinian model of explanation, in which the search for the determining causes of the object of study gives way to selectionism (Laurenti, 2008, 2009b; Micheletto, 1999; Moxley, 1997 a , 1997b, 2004, 2007). Some characteristics are inherited from the model of the evolution of species, and, according to Micheletto (1999), principles such as these become protagonists in the Skinnerian conception of behavior: “Multiplicity, diversity, and the emergence of variations must be highlighted. Variability is a fundamental condition for the existence of man - a being susceptible to producing multiple and varied forms of action, a creative being, and susceptible to change” (p. 39).
By adopting a selectionist model of explanation, Skinner invokes chance, inserting it into his epistemology, no longer making explicit his inability to elucidate the evolutionary dynamics of behavior and cultural practices. Phenomena that can occur by chance, such as genetic, behavioral, and cultural variations, can participate in Skinnerian science. In other words, producing scientific knowledge from phenomena that occur by chance is possible. Recognizing this seems equivalent to doing science on other epistemological bases, different from those that, until now, emphasized the incompatibility between scientific knowledge and chance.
If this is plausible, behaviorist philosophical commitments no longer seem so compatible with assumptions of determinism that seek to eliminate chance in a scientific explanatory system that aspires to absolute prediction and control (Laurenti, 2009a; Mayr, 2004; Moxley, 2007). Such epistemological changes (i.e., from determinism to indeterminism) can also be observed in other sciences, such as physics (Lestienne, 2008; Morf, 2018; Stamos, 2010) and biology, where, by the way, it is argued that determinism can be pointed out as a thesis opposing a selectionist epistemological stance (Lüthy & Palmerino, 2016; see Moxley, 1997b).
There are different interpretations of behaviorism’s (in)deterministic commitments (e.g., Moxley, 1997 b ; 2007; Rodrigues & Strapasson, 2019). The epistemological study of chance suggests that epistemological indeterminism (Laurenti, 2009b) seems to be a position more compatible with the scientific production of a probabilistic object of study, in which chance participates - and Skinnerian selectionism seems to dialogue with this: “…selection by consequences encourages us to think about how supposedly antagonistic notions (regularity and irregularity, predictability and unpredictability, selection and variation) can combine to conceive of something complex, such as behavior” (Laurenti, 2009b, p. 387).
Final considerations
The current work aimed to clarify and discuss the uses of the concept of chance in the Skinnerian text. Two pathways were observed for how Skinner deals with chance: as a concept incompatible with behavior-analytic science, aiming to preserve the desiderata of unequivocal prediction and control in an epistemology aligned with determinism; and as a concept that participates in the explanation of behavior (alongside notions such as variation and probability) in a selectionist scenario, in line with an epistemology better clarified by indeterminism.
The examination of chance thus appears to corroborate investigations that signal epistemological changes in radical behaviorism (Abib, 1999; Laurenti, 2008, 2009b, 2012; Lopes et al., 2018; Micheletto, 1999; Moxley, 1997 a, 1997b, 2002, 2004; Sério, Andery & Micheletto, 2005). In this sense, the concept can be used as an alternative reading key, shedding light on different models of explanation in Skinnerian epistemology. This interpretation (among others) could provide more elements for investigations into the epistemological compatibility of radical behaviorism with selectionism and indeterminism (see Laurenti, 2023)3.
One of the limitations of the present work was not considering other materials from Skinner’s work that could enrich future analyses. Future studies could benefit from expanding the materials examined and extending the discussion to broader behavior-analytic literature. It is also recommended that the process of variation in Behavior Analysis be revisited to question canonical positions, such as that Skinnerian commitments to epistemological determinism are an indisputable point for theoretical and practical effectiveness (Dittrich, 2009; Strapasson & Dittrich, 2011) or the claim that Skinner positions himself in an irremediably deterministic way throughout his work (Dittrich, 2012). In addition, the investigation of other levels of analysis, such as the ontological, could be beneficial to the debate.
Chance is a concept that challenges certain epistemological models. However, such a challenge may be the basis for proposing a science capable of dealing with regularities, deviations, and irregularities in the production of knowledge (Laurenti, 2023; Moxley, 2007). As Laurenti (2023) highlights: “Chance and regularity are united in the selection by consequences model” (p. 7). Therefore, investigating behavior by considering chance can contribute to strengthening the positioning of behavior analysis as a field of study of plurality and diversity.
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1
The search for the identification of causal relationships between events is not an unequivocal prescription in the philosophy of science. For example, Bunge (1959/1963) signals the possibility of a non-causal scientific explanation. In other words, scientific explanation is not only the mere description of causal relationships, and it is possible, differently from this, to attest to the scientific character of alternative strategies (e.g., statistical, structural, and dialectical) (see also Earman, 1986).
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2
When the books were characterized as collections of texts published throughout Skinner's career, their chapters were examined individually, considering, when necessary (and for the purposes of chronological organization of the material), the original publication dates of the texts contained therein. One case exemplifies this process well: Cumulative Record is a collection of texts that covers the period from the 1930s to the 1980s, and for this reason, the chapters that contained the term chance were organized chronologically together with the other books analyzed. This same procedure was adopted in relation to the other collections present in the work consulted.
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3
The dialogue between Behavior Analysis and other areas of knowledge - as recommended by some authors (Rocha et al., 2013; Rodrigues & Strapasson, 2019) - is also strengthened by the study of chance. Guided by this concept, initiatives that explore (in)compatibilities of behaviorism with other philosophies (e.g., Flores Junior et al., 2021; Reis, 2020) may be fruitful in the search for the development of behavior-analytic science.
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Data Availability Statement
Research data is available on request from the corresponding author.
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Funding Information
This work was funded by the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES) - Finance Code 001 and by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) through a project approved in the Universal Public Notice 2021 (Number Process: 423361/2021-0).
Research data is available on request from the corresponding author.
