Cognitive Biases Among Consumers in a Simulated Social Dilemma: False-Consensus, Fundamental Attribution Error, Actor-Observer, and Self-Serving Asymmetry

Decisions between cooperating and competing are central to social dilemmas, that is, when individual needs are at odds with collective benefits. The aim of this paper was to test the occurrence of social cognition biases in a simulated social dilemma, by using (Gifford and Hine, 1997) procedures. After taking part in FISH, a micro-world simulation, either in conditions of cooperation or competition, participants reported their self- and other perceptions. False consensus and fundamental error of attribution were found, while self-serving and actor-observer biases showed more limited effects and only among cooperators. Some theoretical, methodological, and practical implications are discussed in the context of sustainable consumption.

Keywords:
social dilemmas; cognitive biases; cooperation