FAKE NEWS´ COGNITIVE EFFECTS IN COMPLEX DECISION-MAKING AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION: INSIGHTS FROM ARGENTINA

NOTÍCIAS FALSAS COGNITIVOS NA TOMADA DE DECISÕES COMPLEXAS E NA POLARIZAÇÃO POLÍTICA: CONTRIBUIÇÕES DA ARGENTINA

NOTICIAS FALSAS COGNITIVOS EN LA TOMA DE DECISIONES COMPLEJAS Y LA POLARIZACIÓN POLÍTICA: PERSPECTIVAS DESDE ARGENTINA

Abstract

Political polarization has key relevance for today’s democracies. Previous research in political science, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience tends to examine its effects in core countries (such as the United States or European countries). Given the limited literature on these processes in peripheral countries, this review aims to examine the role of fake news in complex decision-making and other cognitive processes involved in political polarization, and to provide insights into its impact in Argentina. To this end, we discuss the cognitive effects of fake news on decisionmaking and political polarization, and highlight the facilitating effects of rebuttal texts as a tool that can promote the review of misinformation resulting from exposure to fake news. We also discusspublic policies applications.

Keywords:
Polarization; Fake News; Rebuttal Texts; Decision-making; Argentina.

Resumo

A polarização política tem relevância fundamental para as democracias atuais. Pesquisas anteriores em ciência política, psicologia social e neurociência cognitiva tendem a examinar seus efeitos em países centrais (como os EUA ou países europeus). Considerando que há pouca literatura sobre esses processos em países periféricos, o objetivo desta revisão é examinar o papel das notícias falsas na tomada de decisões complexas e outros processos cognitivos envolvidos na polarização política, e apresentar insights sobre seu impacto na Argentina. Com esse objetivo, discutimos os efeitos cognitivos das notícias falsas na tomada de decisões e na polarização política, e destacamos os efeitos facilitadores dos textos de refutação, como uma ferramenta que pode promover a revisão de desinformação resultante da exposição a notícias falsas. Também discutimos aplicações em políticas públicas.

Palavras-chave:
Polarização; Notícias Falsas; Textos de Refutação; Tomada de Decisão; Argentina.

Resumen

La polarización política es fundamental para las democracias actuales. Investigaciones previas en ciencias políticas, psicología social y neurociencia cognitiva tienden a examinar sus efectos en países centrales (como Estados Unidos o países europeos). Dada la escasa literatura sobre estos procesos en países periféricos, esta revisión busca examinar el rol de las noticias falsas en la toma de decisiones complejas y otros procesos cognitivos involucrados en la polarización política, y presentar perspectivas sobre su impacto en Argentina. Para ello, analizamos los efectos cognitivos de las noticias falsas en la toma de decisiones y la polarización política, y destacamos el efecto facilitador de los textos de refutación como herramienta que puede promover la revisión de la desinformación derivada de la exposición a noticias falsas. También analizamos sus aplicaciones en políticas públicas.

Palabras clave:
Polarización; Noticias falsas; Textos de refutación; Toma de decisiones; Argentina.

Introduction

The phenomenon of political polarization has taken on key relevance for today’s democracies. Although recent studies have been conducted in political science, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience, most of the literature has tended to examine its effects on central countries (e.g., the US or European countries). Few studies have examined the role of political polarization, decision-making, fake news, and refutation text , and even fewer of these focus on peripheral countries: Table 1 illustrates this by presenting results of bibliometric keywords queries (“Political Polarization”, “Decision-making”, “Fake News”, “Refutation text” and their possible associations) in GoogleScholar and Scopus databases (Mongeon & Paul-Hus, 2016), in relation to Argentina. Taking into account this gap, in this paper we examine the role of fake news in complex decision-making and other cognitive processes in political polarisation, incorporating a perspective from Argentina. We discuss the cognitive processes involved in political polarisation in relation to fake news and decision-making, and highlight the role of rebuttal texts as tools that can promote the revision of misinformation. We also propose applications to public policy.

Table 1
Papers published on (Political) Polarization, Decision-Making, Fake News and Refutation Texts, or associations of these queries, in total or related to Argentina. Data were obtained from GoogeScholar and Scopus databases as of September 2023.

	Scopus		Google Scholar
Keywords	Total	Argentina	Total	Argentina
POLARIZATION (P)	6397	23	57900	7480
FAKE NEWS (FN)	8013	25	267000	18300
DECISION-MAKING (DM)	1059956	2632	2540000	667000
REFUTATION TEXTS (RT)	336	2	1490	27
P&FN	137	1	9780	753
P&DM	232	1	25000	3060
P&RT	0	0	11	0
FN&DM	295	1	44400	3260
FN&RT	1	0	114	3
DM&RF	2	0	306	7
P&FN&DM	5	0	3800	288
P&FN&RT	0	0	7	0
P&DM&RT	0	0	6	0
FN&DM&RT	0	0	77	3
P&FN&DM&RT	0	0	5	0

To achieve this objective, the following sections will be presented: (a) description of how fake news are seeds of polarisation; (b) the cognitive and emotional effects of fake news; (c) background on complex decisions; (d) the dual process framework; (e) the role of fake news in complex decisions; (f) the potential use of refutation text to limit the effect of fake news; (g) the perspective from Argentina; and (h) conclusions and final perspectives.

Fakes News: Seeds For Polarization

Mass political polarization occurs when individuals radicalise their political beliefs, or develop strong and intense group attachments (Sieber & Ziegler, 2019). The issue has been addressed by experimental social psychology. These investigations examine the observed tendency of members of a social group to become radicalised in their initial political views. (Sieber & Ziegler, 2019). There are three operational dimensions of political polarization: cognitive, motivational and affective (Jost et al., 2022). Ideological or cognitive polarization is characterized by a radicalization of political and/or ideological beliefs. It is often operationalised as a bimodal distribution of beliefs, opinions and values, and usually involves groups (such as progressive & conservatives or left-wing & right-wing) that move in opposite directions. Polarization can also occur in relation to political parties. These are often based on shared social and/or cultural beliefs, and express gaps based on social class, region or religion. Finally, affective polarization occurs when members of different social groups (or political parties) have very positive (or negative) feelings towards their own (or other) groups. These three dimensions of polarization can lead citizens to understand politics and society in terms of “us versus/against them”, with potentially harmful consequences for intergroup relations and Democracy (Jost et al., 2022).

In economics and political science, disagreements that underlie polarization are usually considered to have two main sources: (a) differences inreferences, values or beliefs; and (b) differences in the information they process. In relation to differences in preferences, people may disagree about the application of a given policy, because they would benefit from it or not. Differences in the information that processed may lead individuals to support a given policy (or choose a political candidate), given that they have been exposed to biased sources of information, but their beliefs may change if they have to make decisions (Azzimonti & Fernandes, 2023). These sources of polarization may not be independent from each other. For example, conservative social media users have been observed to consume misinformation to a greater extent than liberal users in the US (Mosleh & Rand, 2022).

Although the spread of false information has been used as a weapon in the past, it was not until the emergence of new technologies that fake news became massive (Valero & Oliveira, 2018). These deceptive news stories are closely related to extreme views, propaganda, populism and political manipulation (Tumber & Waisbord, 2021b). Their main purpose is to deceive users, disseminate, and manipulate public discourse to benefit specific economic or political interests. Their spread is facilitated by algorithms, online and social media and advertising companies, where generating quality and verified content is costly, while creating fake news is more attractive, easier and cheaper, or is aimed at genuine manipulation of public discourse for political interests.The impact that fake news has on political decisions has been assessed by several authors (Bago et al., 2020; Kucharski, 2016; Lazer et al., 2018; Pennycook & Rand, 2020), although others consider them to not have an effect on these decisions (Altay et al., 2020; Mercier, 2020a, 2020b) or not being as relevant as cognitive biases (Dunaway, 2021). The sources of fake news can be elites (people and organizations with power (Mosleh & Rand, 2022); although they are also associated with populism (Tumber & Waisbord, 2021b)), state or governmental institutions, media and social networks. In relation to this, fake news was proposed to have played a key role during the Brexit process in the UK (Greene et al., 2021; Höller, 2021; Rose, 2017), the 2016 election campaigns in the US (Bovet & Makse, 2019; Darraj et al., 2017; Dowling, 2022; Fischer & Klazar, 2020; Garrett, 2019; Lazer et al., 2018; Oddleifson, 2020; Rose, 2017), and in election campaigns in peripheral regions such as Trinidad and Tobago, Brazil, Argentina or Latin America and Caribe (Arencibia et al., 2023; Dowling, 2022; Fischer & Klazar, 2020; Oddleifson, 2020; Osuna & Soforza, 2019; Pimenta et al., 2024; Sousa et al., 2023 ). Fake news has been also used massively in campaigns against vaccination (Chiou & Tucker, 2018; Iacobucci, 2019), public policies of prevention during the Covid-19 outbreak (Apuke & Omar, 2021; Rabinovich & Geffner, 2021; Rocha et al., 2021), climate change (Drummond et al., 2020; Lutzke et al., 2019; Pennycook, 2023), social and gender rights (Castellano et al., 2022; Murphy et al., 2019; Osuna & Soforza, 2019; Stabile et al., 2019), among other cases. However, both election campaigns and anti-campaigns are often ideologically or politically related.

Citizens have their own political representations, which may be stronger or weaker depending on their personal, familial or social experience. These representations will be associated, on the one hand, with personal beliefs, values, and social, economic and political expectations. On the other hand, they will serve as a political map to classify candidates or political parties within a left-wing/right-wing or progressive/conservative spectrum (Brussino et al., 2017).

Even though we can discuss the construction of these representations in general, each region or country may have its own specific characteristics (i.e., peronism/anti-peronism in Argentina), which should be analysed in each case in order to understand the cognitive and social determinants of political decisions. These representations may include beliefs, values, common impressions or pieces of information that serve as “anchors” on which people rely to make judgments (De Wilde et al., 2018; Epley & Gilovich, 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) (see Figure 1). These anchors could play a key role in confirmation bias during sampling information, like published in media or social networks. Media news involves, on the one hand, a biased selection of information (disinformation)(García et al., 2020), and on the other hand, inaccurate or misinformation, priming people’s opinions to induce a trust or familiarity perception to any target, like a candidate (Bernal et al., 2022; Pérez et al., 2023). While misleading and partisan content may not be entirely false or fabricated, it may be widespread on social media (Faris et al., 2017). Moreover, although fake news may not be as prevalent as originally thought, fake content can have an impact on individual belief (Guess et al., 2020). The formation of echo chambers, polarization and segregation occur as users select and share content according to a specific narrative, disregarding the rest of the information. Confirmation bias and the lack of high-quality information contribute to the proliferation of biased narratives, fuelling distrust and paranoia (Del Vicario et al., 2015).

Figure
Possible cognitive and social mechanisms by which Fake News might contribute to political polarisation and Refutation Texts to the opposite effect

In order to make a complex decision, the information available to the person during the assessment process, biased by the source and the subject, must be consistent with the subject’s own beliefs, either from a rational/logical (Hammond, 2000) or emotional perspective (Barnes & Thagard, 2019; Thagard, 2001). Refutation texts and accuracy prompts may interfere with this internal coherence by updating the information and minimizing the effect of fake news on the representations generated by the subject; and thus, reversing its effect on polarization.

Cognitive and emotional effects of Fake News

Modern societies are heavily influenced by social media and internet search engines, which utilize machine learning algorithms designed to present users with information that aligns with their interests. In consequence, they benefit not only the sponsors of these websites through the bias imposed by artificial intelligence (Gharibshah et al., 2020; Stehr, 2001), but also the owners of the large technology companies that include such AIs (Mark Zuckerberg, Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk, among others). One downside of the internet revolution and globalization is the increased speed at which fake news spreads, due to its strong emotional content and novelty (Flintham et al., 2018; Shu et al., 2017). In the last decade, the role of emotions in the consumption and belief of fake news, as well as in political decision-making, has been widely studied. Emotions have been proposed to bias people to perceive and process misinformation and diminish their ability to make choices and assess different options properly (Martel et al., 2020). Moreover, higher emotional intelligence is associated with greater capacity to identify fake news (Preston et al., 2021).

Repeated exposure to a piece of information over time could affect a person’s value judgment, regardless of its veracity. This phenomenon is known as the “Illusory Truth Effect” and it was first described by Hasher et al (Hasher et al., 1977), who found that subjects rated statements presented repeatedly as more truthful than the ones presented for the first time.

This effect occurs without the direct intervention of explicit memory (Pennycook et al., 2018). In relation to this, Fazio et al (Fazio et al., 2015) found that prior knowledge about a topic does not prevent the illusory truth effect, as individuals do not rely on correct knowledge they previously possessed, when judging the truthfulness of statements related to the analysed topic.

It is clear how this effect could bias citizens in a context of political campaigns and elections, where news spread dynamically and with a high degree of emotional impact, often lacking proper verification (Rini, 2017). There are several cognitive and metacognitive factors that are related to the illusory truth effect, such as processing fluency and mere exposure effect. When we receive information, the fluency of its processing plays a fundamental role in establishing a value judgment about its veracity. The mere repetition of statements leads to them being processed with greater fluency, and since fluency is used to determine validity, people could be misled when judging its truthfulness (Dechêne et al., 2010; Unkelbach, 2007). The mere-exposure effect, also known as the principle of familiarity, is closely related to the illusory truth effect (Dechêne et al., 2009), as people’s preferences and affective reactions to new information presented can result from and be modified as a result of the repeated presentation of the same one. Unkelbach and Rom (2017) proposed that truth is also judged based on the coherence between new information and prior knowledge.

Complex decision-making

Decision-making involves processes of selecting an option from a set of alternatives, considering its likelihood of leading to the best possible outcome. Unlike other more automatic, faster and less cognitively intensive processes (Ratcliff et al., 2016), complex decision-making (CDM) may involve a higher cognitive processing and longer reflection, though it can also be susceptible to priming (Bernal et al., 2022). The relevance of these decisions has aroused interest in different fields, from experimental psychology to economics, which provides an amalgam of very heterogeneous studies, with diverse approaches included into the framework of Game Theory (Kahneman, 2011; Morgenstern & Von Neumann, 1953; Sanfey, 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) and moral dilemmas (Christensen & Gomila, 2012; Greene, 2015), among others. Some of these paradigms assume that decision-makers are rational and selfish. Kahneman incorporates the idea of relative preference, which might be affected by social norms, expectations, or level of aspiration (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), partially disarming the rationality assumption. In turn, the work of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) was pioneering in dismantling the assumption of selfishness, given that they suggest that decisions may be motivated by aversion to inequality (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) , although other possibly relevant variables include sensitivity to fairness, deservedness and need (Starmans et al., 2017) or social hierarchies (Haidt, 2007; Xie et al., 2017). These aspects are evidence of moral components associated with these decisions. Our conceptualisation of CDM allows us to re-think political decisions, by incorporating the economic and moral dimensions, often analysed separately.

These perspectives enable us to conceptualize individuals as biased political subjects, who are susceptible to being influenced by priming, propaganda or fake news, which can even lead them to radicalize their opinions and beliefs. It is even relevant to point out that these concepts (“rationality”, “selfishness”, “inequality”, “deservedness”, “need”, “social hierarchies” or “authority”) could be constitutive elements of the subjects’ own beliefs (including researchers), which can divide the water in the polarization process.

Dual process theories

Dual Process Theories (DPT) provide a theoretical framework for analysing the cognitive dimension of polarisation (Rathbun, 2020; Yi, 2019). Radicalization towards extremes appears to involve automatic processes, associated with cognitive biases, exacerbated within like-minded communities (Sunstein, 2009).

These theories propose two different types of processes involved in reasoning and decision-making, either dichotomous (Evans, 2009; Kahneman, 2011; Osman, 2004; Pennycook, 2017) or hybrid/continuous (Newell et al., 2015; Osman, 2004; Thompson, 2013). Processes conceptualized as “System 1” are characterized as fast and automatic, susceptible to implicit processing, not necessarily involving awareness; whereas “System 2” processes involve explicit, deliberative, flexible, slow processing and always involve awareness (Evans, 2018; Evans & Frankish, 2009; Osman, 2004). While some DPT consider these processes as dichotomous (although there may be some interaction), alternative hybrid models propose that there is a continuum between both. Even some distinguish between processes based on implicit learning and automatic ones, which would be defined by the individual’s ability to consciously access behaviour, but not the ability to control it (Osman, 2004).

Complex decision-making could acquire a pattern similar to System 1, either through cognitive shortcuts, such as stereotypes or political/ideological representations (Carlin & Love, 2013; Lane & Sulikowski, 2017; Rathbun, 2020), or through induction by emotional or implicit processes (Newell & Shanks, 2014). The interplay between decision-making and emotions is multidimensional and complex. Somatic marker theory (Damasio et al., 1991; but see Dunn et al., 2006) proposes that autonomic responses learned by association in past experiences (known as somatic markers) bias decision-making, by reducing the likelihood of choosing options associated with negative markers.

The emotional state and/or mood can be induced by the constituent stimulus of the choice or decision (as in priming), or by a stimulus that precedes (and extends during) the decision process. In relation to this, repetition and emotional priming have been reported to induce complex decision-making, favouring familiarity and trust. Yet these processes could be interfered by top-down mechanisms, which can take on characteristics of more deliberative processes (Bernal et al., 2022). For example, the appearance of faces or their emotional expression can be used implicitly to make inferences of competence, which suggests that rapid and unreflective trait inferences may contribute to vote choice (Todorov et al., 2005) or increase prosocial behavior (Weiß et al., 2021). In turn, individuals in a happy mood tend to overestimate the probability of positive, and underestimate the likelihood of negative outcomes, while the opposite holds true for individuals in a sad mood (Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Nygren et al., 1996). In an electoral scenario, this aspect could be expressed as emotional climate (Páez et al., 1997), which affects political opinion, decision and polarization. In relation to this, Gault and Sabini (2000) explored the relationship between emotional states and support for different policies. Results indicated an association between anger with greater preference for punishments, and empathy with reparative policies (Gault & Sabini, 2000).

The effects of Fake News on complex decision-making

As was suggested, the role of information in complex decision-making processes is key. In this sense, fake news can be central for radicalizing opinions and, thus, leading to polarization. Motivated reasoning was implicated in the consumption of disinformation, such that «people believe fake news, because it is consistent with their political ideology» (Kahan, 2017). Motivated reasoning posits that our motivations influence how we perceive information, adapting it to our beliefs, opinions, or preferences. Either the preservation of one’s own identity or one’s position in an affinity group that shares fundamental values can generate motivated cognition in relation to politically-relevant facts (Kahan, 2013). While there is no consensus on how motivated reasoning and dual processes’ accounts interact, and hence, the mechanisms involved in misinformation belief (Kahan, 2013, 2017), some authors consider that fake news have an effect, not because they are the result of motivated thinking, but rather because of automatic processes and lack of deliberation (Pennycook & Rand, 2019). Furthermore, the involvement of emotions in what looks like rational reasoning and decision-making, leads to individuals being less meticulous when examining evidence consistent with their beliefs, and more prone to seeking errors in contrary information and opinions (Pennycook & Rand, 2018). Individuals may be more vulnerable to fake news that are congruent with their political ideology. Yet, analytical thinking (System 2) allows discerning between fake and real news, regardless of whether it is consistent or inconsistent with their political ideology (Pennycook & Rand, 2019).

A third relevant framework linked ideological or cultural values to cognitive reasoning styles. Updating Adorno´s “Authoritarian Personality” theory (Adorno, 2019), a substantial body of empirical work hypotheses that right-wing ideology is a manifestation of intellectual traits (such as dogmatism, aversion to complexity, and a craving for certainty or “closure” in argumentation). On this account, it is proposed that the cognitive style of these dispositions implies a reflexive closed-mindedness towards empirical evidence hostile to ideologically conservative beliefs, values or political preferences (Feygina et al., 2010; Jost et al., 2018). Dual-process motivational (DPM) model of ideological attitudes proposes two cognitive dimensions (right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation) to analyse right-wing/conservative thinking and behavior (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). On the other hand, some of the DPT literature suggests that progressive and conservatives differ in the dominance or reliance on which system, 1 or 2, to make a decision (Lane & Sulikowski, 2017).

In the classical view of DTP, the goal of System 2 is the correction of false intuitions (System 1´s outcomes) (Evans & Frankish, 2009), and in this sense, its activation might contribute to preventing the effect of fake news (e.g., through refutation texts). Indeed, social media can lead to inattention and evoke social motivations (e.g. maximize getting “likes”) that could distract from common accuracy motivations and deliberation (Ross et al., 2021). While misinformation may involve misleading content, with a strong partisan bias, or strictly fake or fabricated news, mass dissemination through social networks by agents who believe in them (rather than by bots (Azzimonti & Fernandes, 2023), may favour the radicalisation of ideological moderates, who tend to be more susceptible to “bullshit” (Frankfurt , 2025) than ideological extremists (Sterling et al., 2016). While fact-checking approaches tend to focus on absolute falsehood (of which fake news is an example), hyper-partisan content tends to be certainly more common; though it is not always possible to discriminate which information is biased and which is not (Ross et al., 2021). In the case of populisms, they used to pose a dispute at the level of the media to reinforce the dominant public positions of their leaders, amplify messages and gain visibility, embracing disinformation in several cases (Tumber & Waisbord, 2021a). Most importantly, political polarisation around issues such as misinformation occurs not only despite the lack of logical connection between opposing beliefs and the opposing values of those who espouse them, but may persist despite apparent scientific consensus on the answers to many of these controversial questions (Kahan et al., 2011; Lewandowsky et al., 2013).

In conclusion, integrating cognitive, social and political complexity and understanding their dynamics in the digital age is crucial to effectively address the problem of fake news through interventions that promote information verification, critical thinking and media literacy. In the next session we will analyse the role of refutation texts in promoting the establishment of logical causal connections that allow, through reflection (System 2), to disarm beliefs intuitively installed by fake news, and anchored in personal political/ideological backgrounds.

Promoting conceptual change to overcome the effect of fake news through the presentation of refutation texts

Given that fake news promotes that people acquire inaccurate knowledge (or directly false), it is important to examine how we can promote that this misinformation is revised. Prior research suggests that one of the ways in which this can happen, is by promoting conceptual change (Chi, 2008). As was suggested, incorrect ideas that result from exposure to fake news, differ from scientifically accepted concepts, and may be difficult to change (Garcés, 2018). Prior studies have highlighted the effectiveness of the presentation of refutation texts in promoting the revision of these ideas. These texts are designed by modifying original texts, in order to make explicit the prior incorrect ideas that participants have about a topic, refuting them, and presenting correct information. The co-activation of the incorrect and correct ideas is expected to promote the identification of the contradiction between them, given that the cognitive conflict between them should induce deep engagement and critical thinking (Kendeou & Van Den Broek, 2007; Muis et al., 2018). Refutation texts have been widely used to promote that learners overcome misconceptions related to different topics. Among these studies, Diakidoy et al. (2003)(Diakidoy et al., 2003) and Mason et al. (2008)(Mason et al., 2008) observed that they promoted that participants monitored their comprehension, generated inferences and reviewed their prior incorrect knowledge (Kendeou & Van Den Broek, 2007; Lassonde et al., 2016; McCrudden, 2012; Sinatra & Broughton, 2011). In turn, Aguilar et al. (2019) observed that refutation texts reduced participants’ misconceptions and significantly increased their correct ideas about educational policies. The refutation text used in this study consisted of 240 words, and was organized into four paragraphs:

1. The majority of charter schools are managed by for-profit organizations. (False) This is false [in California it is approximately 3% of charter schools (Zinshteyn, 2017)], but in our 2014 poll we found that only 26% of participants correctly identified it as such (45% said it was true).

2. State policies allow charter schools to charge tuition. (False) This is false, which 39% of participants correctly identified in 2014 (31% said it was true).

3. State law forbids charter schools from picking and choosing which students to enroll. (true)

This is true, which 31% of participants correctly identified in 2014 (25% said charter schools could select which students they prefer when over-enrolled).

4. Charter schools are held to the same testing and accountability laws as traditional public schools. (True)

We did not ask this question on our poll, but we believed it might be a common misconception; we added it to our study for length.

Kessler et al. (2019) also found that refutation texts can correct misconceptions about vaccines. However, they suggest that the revision of knowledge depends on individual differences. People with cognitive needs were more receptive to the refutation texts, and reading them led to them acquiring accurate ideas about the usefulness of vaccines. Yet, people with more flexible thinking showed less acceptance of accurate information and the rebuttal texts had the counterproductive effect of increasing their misconceptions about vaccines. Schmid and Betsch (2022) found that debunking texts can reduce the credibility of misinformation about mRNA vaccines. Also, participants with higher levels of spirituality (experimental and control group) tend to believe more in misinformation, have less confidence and intention to vaccinate. Trevors and Ladhani (2022) examined the role of the presentation of refutation texts in a public health education campaign, which involved a digital gamified environment. Participants who used gamified refutation texts retained correct information about Covid-19, and experienced a higher number of positive emotional reactions (happiness) and a lower number of negative emotional reactions (anger, scepticism), in comparison to participants who read traditional refutation texts.

In relation to what makes refutations texts effective, Ecker et al. (2020) indicate that the repetition of the incorrect information facilitates knowledge revision, given that it highlights the incongruence between the incorrect and correct information. This is expected to promote that the correct information is integrated into the mental representation that the participant constructs. The emotions of the comprehender triggered by refutation texts have also been proposed to facilitate the revision of prior incorrect knowledge. In relation to this, Jacobson et al. (2022) found that emotions such as hope and surprise may mediate the process of knowledge revision, and facilitate the acceptance of refutations. Also, when people experience curiosity, they seem to be more open to new knowledge, and to update their prior incorrect knowledge. In addition, experiencing hope appears to generate a sense of optimism about the ability to revise their knowledge, which increases their willingness to revise their knowledge.

To sum up, given the cognitive effects of fake news on beliefs that would lead people to radicalize their positions and make decisions, it is important to correctly apply refutation texts, supported by an effective emotional context, to trigger deliberative processes that would disarm misinformation.

Argentina: A Peripheral Regional Case

While the phenomenon of political polarization shakes many countries around the world, most of the literature analyses the phenomenon and its causes in the central countries and from a local perspective. While it is true that cognitive causes can be generalisable, the triggers and beliefs in question may vary according to the historical/political trajectory of each country and the tensions with regional or central countries. In this sense, for example, fake news about the war in Ukraine, could have a greater effect in Europe or US than in Latin America; but depending on the country, and the internal tensions between groups with interests aligned with the US or Russia, such fake news could have a different local impact.

In particular, Latin America has had an alternating trajectory between democratic, populism or self-imposed military governments. In fact, Argentina celebrated 40 years of uninterrupted democracy in 2023. Most of the left-wing experiences in Latin America responded to the representations of the “old bipolar world”, prior to the collapse of the USSR (Brussino et al., 2017). Right-wing experiences have been influenced by the central countries, or the emergence of neoliberalism worldwide in the 1980s. In a way, all these experiences ended up concentrating on bipartisan forms (centre-left and centre-right), with the flexibility to move across the ideological spectrum according to international tensions (e.g. requirements from international organisms such as the International Monetary Fund).

In 20th century Argentina, this bipartisanship took the form of the Radical Civic Union (UCR, acronym in Spanish) and Peronism. Juan Domingo Peron was a military leader who came to power first through military dictatorship and then democratically; he had a populist policy in favour of workers’ and women’s rights, but under an authoritarian doctrine, a cult of the leader and associated with some religious values. For this reason, Peronism represents a broad, heterogeneous, populist political movement (which has been able to capture different popular social sectors); although it originally claimed to be a third world position (neither with the US nor with the USSR), it has had an anti-left policy since its origins (Kabat, 2017). Without this historical background, it would be very difficult to understand how the current Argentine bipartisanship, expressed as “Peronism/anti-Peronism”, has played a role, as dominant political representations, in the affective polarization in Argentina (Ideological identity, issue-based ideology and bipolar affective polarization in multiparty systems: the cases of Argentina, Chile, Italy, Portugal and Spain). The representations of progressivism or conservatism/neoliberalism, which have mostly replaced left-right representations, constitute different dimensions to those local representations, and are therefore insufficient to explain the phenomenon of polarization (Brussino et al., 2017). Another key aspect in understanding ideological polarization is the prevalence of populations that strongly adhere to religious values. Although populist experiences in Latin America are largely anchored in religion (Siles et al., 2021), it is valuable to recognise that in the case of Argentina, it allows us to understand both right-wing and centre-left populism. For example, one of its transversal concepts of Peronism (“social justice”) is taken from Catholic social doctrine. On the other hand, the strong adherence to Catholic values in some regions or the increasing growth, especially in low-income sectors, of evangelical religions is associated with the conservative side of the ideological spectrum, constituting part of the anti-rights groups that then form the social basis of the right-wing populism.

After the economic and political crisis of 2001 (generated by the neoliberal peronist Carlos Menem governments, 1989 to 1999, which exploded during a coalition government with the UCR), Nestor Kirchner won presidential elections in 2003, constituting the Kirchnerism, a more recent centre-left populist version of Peronism. In 2015, Mauricio Macri, the artificial of a national coalition against it (“Cambiemos”; later, “Juntos por el Cambio”), including the UCR among other parties, with a centre-right perspective, won presidential elections, reviving the old dichotomy, now in the form of Macrism/Kirchenism. This opposition (locally known as the “gap”) grew in intensity, blaming each other for Argentina’s main political, social and economic problems, until it took on a polarized form of “one against the other” (Bonvillani, 2020).

In addition to the role of bipartisanship, political polarization has been exacerbated by a number of factors, including the country’s history of economic instability, the recent Covid-19 pandemic (Lisińska, 2023; Resico, 2020; Torrente et al., 2022), economic inequality, social media, and the media (Di Tella et al., 2021), between others. Economic inequality was proposed as a major driver of political polarization in Argentina, and because of its long history of economic instability, with periods of hyperinflation and high levels of poverty, the country has a great income gap that has led to an increase in polarization (Olivieri & Horenstein, 2004). Other variables of social inequality, such as gender inequality and health care, contributed to the strong political polarization. Once rights or laws that minimized these social asymmetries were achieved, anti-rights groups organized around opposing those laws or rights, increasing polarization.

Social networks have played a role in political polarization in Argentina, creating echo chambers where people are only exposed to information that confirms their pre-existing beliefs (Di Tella et al., 2021), especially around issues related to the pandemic, social security and the role of the State. Thus, network users tend to be more polarized, not finding easy to tolerate alternative political views (Mitchelstein et al., 2021), or even becoming more extremist (Sunstein, 2009). In this sense, it cannot be ruled out that the covid pandemic has not only contributed to the conglomeration of anti-science, anti-vaccine or anti-health policy groups, but also that forced isolation has favoured hermeticism and the formation of digital communities, one of the recognised causes of polarization (Qureshi et al., 2020). These conditions may have amplified the role of information in agenda-setting (Hyun & Moon, 2016), through widely biased news (García et al., 2020) or even fake news. Indeed, previously, the marketing strategy that succeeded in imposing M. Macri in the 2015 presidential elections involved the use of social media extensively, trolls and fake news (De Maio, 2019). A recent survey published by the Economic and Social Council of Argentina (CES) and UNTREF University (2023) (CES, 2023) found that approximately one third of the population interviewed indicated that they receive fake news daily (17.9% several times a day and 12.5% at least once a day), and more than half of the sample acknowledged receiving it frequently (once a week or more). The study also found out that more than 50% of the people surveyed suffered virtual assaults at least once, and misinformation and hate speech were among the most mentioned in the survey.

All those factors have contributed to an increase in the distance between the political positions of opposing groups, as well as an increase in the intensity of political disagreements. But, more importantly, they have implied an increase in the population that associates with increasingly right-wing political options. In fact, both sides of the bipartisanship (Macrism/Kirchnerism) have had an increasingly right-wing shift in their policies, candidate options and discourse, with strong proposals in favour of increasing security, against social mobilizations and in favour of the adjustment of the state (Svampa, 2020). In this context, where neither of the two parties has been able to solve the basic social and economic problems of the Argentine people, a third option associated with an anti-rights, anti-science, libertarian right-wing position has grown. In the recent presidential elections (2023), the candidate Javier Milei, representing this position, won the ballotage with 55.65%. This result reveals a trend towards right-wing radicalization, while approximately a (historical) increasing part of the population abstained from voting (30% in P.A.S.O.; 23% in General election and ballotage). Scepticism, cynicism, and apathy towards democratic institutions (Pinkleton et al., 2002) may be evidence of an erosion of traditional forms of politics and the two-party system, contributing to polarization. On the other hand, information has been key to manipulating the masses in favour of certain electoral results or economic interests, amplifying the phenomenon. Argentina, far from being an exception, is a paradigmatic case of political polarization. Polarisation and radicalisation towards the right is an international trend: examples include Brazil (during the last right-wing government), the USA (first and second Trump governments), Poland, Hungary, and the rise of the extreme or alt-right in Europe, among others.

Conclusions & Future Directions

Given the research we have reviewed, political polarisation is one of the main problems facing democracies today, and we propose that it should be analysed as a deepening of strongly two-party political systems. The rise of radicalised anti-rights, anti-vaccine and anti-science groups, deepening economic crises (with a considerable increase in global poverty) and political institutions, the increasing marketisation of politics, the climate crisis, endless wars and the emergence of pandemics (such as Covid-19) associated with our socio-economic practices, have all contributed to the substratum of such polarisation. The role of the media in seeding inaccurate, hyper-partisan or false information (fake news), and of social networks as echo chambers to amplify it in isolated digital communities, needs to be addressed. While this has been part of the academic agenda since the era of mass communication began, we insist on the need for further research to demonstrate how disinformation influences the cognitive level, in a social context of clear information saturation, which inevitably leads to the inability to discriminate quality information (the era of “post-truth”). Regarding how to reduce the cognitive impact of misinformation, it will be essential to examine how we can facilitate the comprehension of refutation texts and to consider presenting them as part of social impact campaigns that focus on key issues (such as the promotion of gender and economic equality, human rights, between others).It will also be essential to discuss as a society how to regulate new technologies, in order to set boundaries on the creation and propagation of fake news, and to design tools, including AI algorithms, to identify such misinformation. Finally, we see the importance of pointing out that all these mechanisms that favour polarization and the dissemination of fake news are only effective to the extent that accurate and reliable knowledge and information is not a resource that is easily, publicly and freely accessible. Therefore, these conditions of knowledge production must be on the agenda in order to discuss how to deal with political polarization.

• Financing There was no financing
• Image use consent Does not apply
• Approval, ethics and consent Does not apply

AVAILABILITY OF DATA AND MATERIALS

The datasets used or analyzed during the current study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

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• Cientific editor
  Dr. Ana Cecília Marotta Mendez

Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  21 Nov 2025
• Date of issue
  2025

History

• Received
  10 July 2024
• Reviewed
  21 May 2025
• Accepted
  23 May 2025