Resumen en Inglés:

Abstract Branden Fitelson (2010) proposes a strengthened version of knowledge from falsehood, according to which one may not have known that p had one not falsely believed that q. However, Federico Luzzi (2019) challenges Fitelson’s proposal. He believes that Fitelson’s account is unsuccessful because it depends on the unjustified assumption about the impossibility of knowledge from Gettierized belief. For Luzzi, Fitelson faces a dilemma: he must either accept knowledge from Gettierization and abandon his own theory about inferential knowledge from robustly false belief, or accept that knowledge from Gettierization is different from his account and deny knowledge from falsehood. He can’t have both. The goal of this paper is to dissolve that dilemma. The essay proceeds as follows. I explain Fitelson’s account and Luzzi’s objection against it. In the final section, I argue that a defeasibility theory of knowledge can help Fitelson defend himself against Luzzi’s objection and, therefore, dissolve the dilemma.

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Abstract I introduce what I call the Propositional Stance - the consensual claim that Frank Jackson’s Mary acquires new propositional knowledge - and discuss two prominent arguments that have been put forth in its favor. The first argument concerns the semantics of what-it-is-like sentences. The second argument concerns the epistemology of phenomenal belief. I argue that both arguments are unconvincing or lead to undesirable consequences, and then motivate non-propositional knowledge approaches to the puzzle of The Knowledge Argument.

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Abstract Some facts are grounded, and some are fundamental (ungrounded). Roberto Loss has recently presented an argument (which is a counterpart of the famous Fitch's paradox of knowability) that there are no ungrounded facts. I argue that this argument is not unrestrictedly valid, and one of the central premises of Loss’s argument - distributivity of grounding (PG) - is not unrestrictedly true. Also, I offer a reason to think that all facts of the form “A is not a grounded fact” are fundamental.

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Abstract Ordinary thinkers don’t know every necessary truth - they are not “logically omniscient.” Furthermore, they don’t know everything that follows from their beliefs - they are not “deductively omniscient.” Stalnaker has famously argued that this is partly due to the “fragmentation” of our beliefs, which are divided into different belief-states. Elga and Rayo have developed this idea, arguing that an agent has access to different information under different conditions, such that her doxastic state is divided (“fragmented”) into different informational states. In this article, I distinguish fragmentation from an alternative approach to limited information access. According to this second approach, our limited access to information is explained by our representation-processing mechanisms - the ways in which mental representations are processed by our cognitive systems. I argue that this approach must be sharply distinguished from fragmentation: The limitations that result from our representation-processing mechanisms need not amount to a fragmented doxastic state. The distinction is especially significant given recent objections against fragmentation: Stalnaker’s and Elga and Rayo’s views still seem to attribute an implausible amount of knowledge to ordinary thinkers. I show that an account based on representation processing avoids these objections, thereby opening up a viable alternative to fragmentation.

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Abstract This review critically examines Frances Egan’s Deflating Mental Representation (MIT Press, 2025), a seminal work in the philosophy of mind that challenges traditional conceptions of mental representation and intentionality. Egan argues for a deflationary account wherein ascriptions of content to mental states are pragmatically grounded and serve primarily as explanatory tools, rather than reflecting substantive representational relations. The book navigates scientific, everyday, and philosophical contexts, showing how content attribution functions as a “gloss” that aids explanation without committing to metaphysical assumptions about representation. While Egan’s approach offers solutions to long-standing debates, it also faces critical tensions regarding the individuation of mental states and the role of the external environment. This review highlights both the originality and the philosophical challenges of Egan’s position, underscoring the book’s contribution to ongoing debates in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind.