Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract When one speaks duplicitously one performs a (risky) speech act and at the same time intends that one have deniability regarding that speech act. What is it for a speaker who performs an illocutionary act to have deniability regarding that act? I first review an answer to this question proposed by Alexander Dinges and Julia Zakkou. According to them, deniability is “an epistemic notion. A speaker has deniability if she can make it epistemically irrational for her audience to reason in certain ways” (2023, p. 373). I argue, however, that the epistemic account is refuted by a counterexample, and informed by the counterexample, I propose an alternative. According to my alternative account, deniability concerns illocutionary norms: a speaker has deniability regarding an illocutionary action iff (i) she is permitted to deny having performed the action, and (ii) if she denies having performed the action, she thereby avoids being responsible for it. I conclude by considering the implications of illocutionary norms account of deniability for the vexed issue of the determinants of illocutionary force; I argue that the illocutionary norms account of deniability provides evidence in support of McDonald’s (2021) “collaboration” view.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract The semantic value of a demonstrative in a given context is the object of joint attention shared by the participants in a conversation, which King refers to as the ‘coordinated object.’ This is at least the case when the speaker’s plan to align perspectives is successful. However, when there is a conflict between the intended reference and what is made manifest by a demonstration, either no coordinated object is established, or the semantic value is the demonstratum. This is King’s response to Kaplan’s Carnap/Agnew scenario. His explanation does not address how the reference to an object becomes part of the common ground. Reference selection always occurs against a doxastic background and results from the collaborative efforts of the agents involved in the conversation. I propose an amendment to King’s coordination account that more accurately reflects the collaborative nature of referring. However, it is uncertain whether this amendment results in a metasemantics for demonstratives. The introduction of a reference to an object in the common ground exhibits the distinctive features of pragmatic processes.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract Cognitive distortions, systematic biases in thinking that lead to erroneous beliefs and emotional distress, are challenging to identify and address due to their extensive variability and context-dependent nature. This paper explores the limitations of traditional approaches, such as Beck’s cognitive model of depression, in consistently detecting these distortions across diverse therapeutic settings. This approach uses conditional statements to help reframe distorted thoughts. It is based on relevance theory, which emphasizes how context and cognitive effects play a crucial role in effective communication. By focusing on the pragmatic relationships within conditional statements, therapists may better understand and address distorted thinking patterns. This approach aligns with non-labeling strategies in Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) and Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT), fostering a more collaborative therapeutic process. The synthesis of conditional statements with relevance theory offers a structured framework for addressing cognitive distortions, potentially improving therapeutic interventions.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract Differences in informativeness regarding truth-conditional and presuppositional content elicit scalar inferences. Many sentences carry not-at-issue, non-presupposed content, e.g. conventional implicatures. This raises the question whether differences in informativeness due to differences in CI content license scalar inferences as well (let us call them anti-conventional implicatures). In previous work, I have shown that certain expressions do license anti-conventional implicatures, and I accounted for the data by postulating a pragmatic principle called Maximize conventional implicatures!, which directs the speaker to use the alternative with the stronger conventional implicatures among those that are formal alternatives and are contextually relevant. Slurs pose a challenge for this view, since they do not seem to license scalar inferences. In this article, I advance an explanation of the data about slurs that is compatible with Maximize conventional implicatures! The gist of the argument hinges upon the notion of linguistic markedness. It has been argued that scalar inferences are blocked if linguistic markedness is not held fixed. I contend that slurs are sociolinguistically marked, and that this is what accounts for the fact that the use of a slur’s neutral counterpart does not license the expected scalar expressive inference.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract In this paper, we will provide na overview of different mechanisms involved in pejoration. Specifically, we will focus on the analysis of three different phenomena in Rioplatense Spanish. First, we will analyze the suffix -ito (‘little’ [suffix]) and how it combines with bases to form pejorative expressions, such as abogadito (‘little lawyer’) and sordito (‘little deaf’). Second, we will analyze (with the support of experimental evidence) the semantics of pejorative expressions, such as puto (‘faggot’), tortillera (‘dyke’), and estúpido (‘stupid’). Finally, we will analyze the pragmatics involved in expressive speech acts that might be used to express contempt toward someone, such as Los del manya son todos putos (‘The ones of the manya are all faggot’). We will assume that pejoration is a negative attitude that is reflected at different linguistic levels. We will defend that pejoration goes beyond the linguistic levels, it may be expressed linguistically, but it may not need to. Pejoration allows us to use neuter terms negatively, change the target of a group insult, and so on. Pejoration is a phenomenon we should consider more carefully when we are dealing with expressions that can potentially be used as a part of hate speech. Pejoration is not a semantic dimension, it is na attitude that can be reflected in our linguistic system.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract The present paper explores resources provided by ontology of satisfiable objects (an ontologico-semantic framework proposed by F. Moltmann) for development of a referential analysis of performative utterances. In order to position ontology of satisfiable (including attitudinal and modal) objects among other ontological options for theories of meaning, I compare it to ontology of propositions and ontology of acts and events. Then I address the notion of performative utterances and its ontological background in Austin, as well as assertion-oriented accounts of performative utterances, contending with the initial Austinian account. I put forward the hypothesis that adoption of satisfiable objects ontology is a way to an integrative vision of truth and felicity of performative utterances. I discuss the logical form ascribed to performative utterances by Moltmann and then outline my proposal for their analysis within the framework of ontology of satisfiable objects.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract This special issue presents a snapshot of pragmatics at a moment of rapid expansion, where the field’s traditional concerns with speech acts, implicature, and reference now intersect with questions of power, social norms, and psychological agency. Moving beyond familiar textbook examples, the contributions selected here examine how language operates within contexts of public contestation, interpersonal conflict, digital communication, and even private reasoning. Several papers revisit core pragmatic concepts; others extend pragmatic tools into new domains. Together, these articles demonstrate a field both theoretically rigorous and socially attuned, revealing pragmatics as the site where fine-grained linguistic structure meets the broader dynamics of social life.