Open-access ON THE ALLEGED ERROR OF FORMAL OBJECTIONS TO NORMATIVE ERROR THEORY

According to Streumer and Wodak, a particular type of formal objection to normative error theory fails because it rests on a questionable assumption about the logical duality of the normative concepts of permissibility and impermissibility. In this discussion, we argue that there is an error in their indictment; as such, the formal objection to normative error theory might still prevail.

Keywords:
Classical Logic; Gappy Logic; Glutty Logic; Logical Duality; Normative Concepts; Normative Error Theory

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