Flores, Silvia Amélia Mendonça; Sonza, Igor Bernardi

doi:10.1590/1980-53575331sfis

Artigo de Pesquisa • Estud. Econ. 53 (3) • Jul-Sep 2023 • https://doi.org/10.1590/1980-53575331sfis linkcopiar

Determinants of RPTs in the Brazilian stock market: analysis of control-ownership wedge, firm value, performance and corporate governance

Este estudo tem como objetivo analisar a influência do desvio de controle-propriedade, valor da firma, desempenho e governança corporativa no valor das Transações com Partes Relacionadas (TPRs) de empresas com estrutura piramidal. A pesquisa é realizada no Brasil durante um período de oito anos, de 2010 a 2017, e utiliza uma amostra não balanceada de 153 empresas ou 929 observações empresa-ano. O artigo usa um painel OLS e uma regressão quantílica como robustez. Os resultados mostram que o desvio de controle-propriedade, desempenho e governança corporativa são determinantes do valor total dos TPRs. O desvio tem influência positiva, mostrando que o excesso de direitos de controle aumenta o valor total das TPRs. Por outro lado, o desempenho tem efeito negativo, mostrando que empresas menos lucrativas possuem incentivos para participar de TPRs. Na governança corporativa, a relação é positiva, ao contrário do esperado na literatura. Sinaliza que o ambiente de governança corporativa no Brasil não reduziu o valor total das TPRs nas empresas piramidais. A pesquisa contribui com a literatura ao apresentar evidências de um mercado emergente e relacionar temas relevantes em finanças corporativas, caracterizando a utilização de TPRs por empresas com estrutura piramidal.

Palavras-chave:
Transações com partes relacionadas; Piramidal; Propriedade; Desempenho; Valor da firma; Governança corporativa

Variable	Abbreviation	Measure	References	ES
Variable dependent
Total value RPTs	RPTs	Log (RPTs) company/year.	Matos and Galdi (2014); Silveira, Prado, and Sasso (2008)
Variables independents
Deviation	DEV	Log Deviation=VR¹ - CFR²	Aldrighi (2014); Aldrighi, Postali, and Diaz (2018)	+
Return on assets	ROA	ROA = $\frac{O p e r a t i n g i n c o m e}{T o t a l a s s e t s}$	Maheshwari and Gupta (2018); Wang, Cho, and Lin (2019)	+ or -
Tobin’s Q	QT	$Q T = \frac{M a r k e t v a l u e o f e q u i t y + B o o k v a l u e o f d e b t}{T o t a l a s s e t s}$	Bona-Sánchez, Fernández-Senra, and Pérez-Alemán (2017); Maheshwari and Gupta (2018)	+ or -
New Market³	NM	Dummy, where 1 indicates the firms listed on the New Market and 0 otherwise.	Aldrighi, Postali, and Diaz (2018)	-
Big Four	Big4	Dummy, where 1 indicates that the company is audited by one of Big 4; 0 otherwise.	Bhuiyan and Roudaki (2018); Rahmat, Mohd Amin, and Mohd Saleh (2018).
Audit committee⁴	AuditCom	Dummy, where 1 indicates if the majority of the members of the audit committee are independent; 0 otherwise.	Kang et al., (2014); Rahmat, Mohd Amin, and Mohd Saleh (2018).
Control variables
Size	Size	Logarithm of net sales.	Kang et al. (2014)	+
Leverage	LEV	$L E V = \frac{S h o r t a n d l o n g t e r m d e b t}{T o t a l a s s e t s}$	Aldrighi, Postali, and Diaz (2018); Maheshwari and Gupta (2018)	+ or -
Tangibility	TANG	$T A N G = \frac{F i x e d a s s e t}{T o t a l a s s e t}$	Aldrighi, Postali, and Diaz (2018); Souza and Bortolon (2014)	+ or -
Foreign capital	FC	Dummy, where 1 indicates ordinary and/or preferred shares owned by foreign capital; 0 otherwise.	Cheung et al. (2009)	+
Sector Fixed effects	Dummies, where 1 indicates the sector; 0 otherwise		Bona-Sánchez, Fernández-Senra, and Pérez-Alemán (2017) Kang et al. (2014)
Temporal Fixed effects	Dummies, where 1 indicates the year; 0 otherwise

Statistics	RPTs	DEV	ROA	QT	Size	LEV	TANG
Mean	20.382	0.315	0.059	0.951	27.420	0.536	0.118
Median	20.298	0.195	0.059	0.778	27.760	0.583	0.004
p10	16.869	0.000	-0.082	0.265	24.103	0.126	0.000
p25	18.880	0.000	0.007	0.557	26.216	0.330	0.000
p75	22.358	0.614	0.121	1.097	29.155	0.739	0.160
p90	23.969	0.904	0.216	1.865	30.007	0.872	0.455
Variance	6.372	0.119	0.013	0.489	4.884	0.071	0.039
Minimum	15.364	-0.001	-0.224	0.076	22.267	0.028	0.000
Maximum	24.596	0.942	0.278	3.059	30.450	0.957	0.651
SD	2.524	0.345	0.115	0.699	2.210	0.267	0.198
Asym.	-0.179	0.669	-0.420	1.641	-0.742	-0.375	1.663
Kurt.	2.358	1.906	3.549	5.533	2.868	2.130	4.430

	RPTs	DEV	ROA	QT	NM	Big4	AuditCom	Size	LEV	TANG	FC
RPTs	1
DEV	0.138	1
ROA	-0.047	0.032	1
QT	0.025	-0.031	-0.013	1
NM	0.182	-0.085	0.037	0.341	1
Big4	0.107	0.067	0.241	0.008	0.011	1
AuditCom	0.202	-0.040	-0.031	0.210	0.223	0.037	1
Size	0.177	0.011	-0.008	-0.043	0.105	-0.017	0.156	1
LEV	0.156	0.030	-0.193	0.132	-0.127	-0.174	0.040	0.161	1
TANG	0.164	0.062	0.060	-0.080	-0.042	0.047	-0.027	0.134	0.046	1
FC	0.110	0.059	-0.000	0.148	0.171	-0.016	0.118	0.098	-0.177	-0.017	1

Variable	Abbreviation	Coefficient	Standard Deviation
Dependent variable: Log total value RPTs
Intercept		1.809**	-
Deviation	DEV	0.020***	(0.004)
Return on assets	ROA	-0.007	(0.005)
Tobin’s Q	QT	-0.018	(0.017)
New Market	NM	0.057	(0.046)
Big Four	Big4	0.076	(0.051)
Audit committee	AuditCom	0.162***	(0.028)
Size	Size	0.013	(0.021)
Leverage	LEV	0.086	(0.096)
Tangibility	TANG	0.076	(0.055)
Foreign capital	FC	0.080*	(0.036)
Sector	Yes
Year	Yes
Number of obs.	400
R²	0.154
Jarque-Bera	6.340
p-value	0.042
T.Wald	3.300
p-value	0.000
T.Woodridge	1.879
p-value	0.175
Mean VIF	1.160

Variable	Abbreviation	Dependent Variable: Log total value RPTs
Variable	Abbreviation	0,10	0,25	0,50	0,75	0,90
Deviation	DEV	0.021*	0.020***	0.020***	0.019***	0.019**
SD		(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Return on assets	ROA	-0.015***	-0.010***	-0.006***	-0.003	0.000
SD		(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Tobin’s Q	QT	-0.025	-0.021	-0.017	-0.013	-0.010
SD		(0.037)	(0.023)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.027)
New Market	NM	0.188**	0.118**	0.047	-0.005	-0.055
SD		(0.090)	(0.058)	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.068)
Big Four	BIG4	-0.033	0.024	0.084	0.128**	0.169*
SD		(0.120)	(0.077)	(0.052)	(0.063)	(0.090)
Audit Committee	AuditCom	0.300***	0.226***	0.151***	0.096**	0.043
SD		(0.076)	(0.049)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.057)
Size	Size	0.004	0.009	0.013**	0.016**	0.019*
SD		(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Leverage	LEV	0.198	0.138	0.078	0.033	-0.009
SD		(0.152)	(0.097)	(0.066)	(0.080)	(0.114)
Tangibility	TANG	0.233**	0.149**	0.064	0.001	-0.057
SD		(0.105)	(0.068)	(0.046)	(0.055)	(0.078)
Foreign capital	FC	0.015	0.049	0.085**	0.111***	0.135**
SD		(0.085)	(0.054)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.063)
Year		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of obs.			400

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Departamento de Economia; Faculdade de Economia, Administração, Contabilidade e Atuária da Universidade de São Paulo (FEA-USP) Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto, 908 - FEA 01 - Cid. Universitária, CEP: 05508-010, Tel.: (55 11) 3091-5803/5947 - São Paulo - SP - Brazil
E-mail: estudoseconomicos@usp.br

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[TFN1] This table provides the of dependent, independent and control variables. The RPTs variable considered the period of reference disclosed by the companies and not specifically the transaction date, as many transactions remain active for the long term. Note: ¹VR: voting rights from the existence of the control; ²CFR: cash flow rights; ³New Market is the translation for “Novo Mercado,” which represents the special listing segment of the Brazilian stock exchange [B³]. ⁴Audit committee: companies without an audit committee assumes zero value. ES (expected sign) corresponds to the association between dependent and independent variables. The expected sign is based on the empirical literature review.

[TFN2] Source: Developed by the authors (2022).